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INDAMI Presents...
The 4th Annual Latin American and
Caribbean Summer Dance Institute
The next Summer Dance Institute is scheduled for June 25July 1, 2001 and will feature Grupo Cultural Uk’ux Pop Wuj of
Chichicastenango, Guatemala. Formed in 1991 with the mission
of rescuing and fostering Mayan cultural traditions through a
blend of dance and music, the company’s signature work, the
Creation of Man, is based on the sacred book of the M aya
Quiche, the Pop (time) Wuj (book). The piece follows the four
stages of creation in accordance with Mayan belief-man of mud
or clay, man of wood, monkey man and human beings. Other
dances include the Deer Dance, the Courtship and Maize
Sowing. The group has performed in New York, Mexico and
throughout Guatemala.
In conjunction with the performance, Jan Hanvik, executive
director of Pan American Musical Art Research in New York City
and a Fulbright senior scholar in dance, will lecture on Mayan rit
ual and culture. Hanvik has conducted field research in
Guatemala and other Central and South American countries and
is the author of many articles on Latin American dance.
The program also includes: 1) Technique classes in indigenous
Bolivian folkloric dance, Haitian, Afro-Cuban, capoeira, and
Caribbean dance and drumming with internationally recognized
teachers and artists, including Ecuadorian choreographer Susanna
Reyes; Caribbean choreographer Peter London, formerly of the
M artha Graham Dance Company; Brazilian choreographer
Giovanni Luquini; Bolivia Magica; and Louines Louinis of the
Jean Leon Destine Haitian Dance Company. 2) Interdisciplinary,
team-taught academic seminars in “Cultural Crosscurrents and
Hybridity: Amerindians and Africans in the New World” and
“Amerindian and African Dance and Culture in the New World”
with FIU humanities and social science scholars. 3) Panel discus
sions with distinguished artists and scholars in the field, including
Allegra Fuller Snyder, Professor Emerita, University of CaliforniaLos Angeles. Courses may be taken for academic credit.
Produced in collaboration with the Florida Dance Association
and the Florida Dance Festival, the Summer Dance Institute is
co-sponsored by FIU’s Department of Theatre and Dance,
African-New World Studies Program and Latin American and
Caribbean Center. The Institute is a component of the “Dancing
Across Disciplines” project funded by the US Department of
Education’s Fund for the Improvement of Post-Secondary
Education.
To find out more about Summer Dance Institute 2001 or other
INDAMI programs, please contact: Niurca Marquez, Program
Coordinator,, Intercultural Dance and Music Institute, Florida
International University, Latin American and Caribbean Center,
University Park, DM 353, M iami, Florida 33199, Phone: (305)
348-2894, Fax: (305) 348-3593, E mail: indami@fiu.edu.

Grupo Cultural Uk’ux Pop Wuj was form ed
in 1991 with the mission o f rescuing and
fostering Mayan cultural traditions through
a blend o f dance and music. The company’s
signature work is based on the sacred book o f
the Maya Quiche.
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ore than 500 years after the great wave of European colonization of the Americas began,
race remains a charged issue in many parts of the hemisphere. From the northern reaches
of Canada to the tip of South America, modern societies struggle with the legacy of con
quered indigenous populations and African slavery. Resolving these internal tensions has
taken on a new urgency as the regions economies move closer toward integration and
globalization, putting new strains on marginalized communities and raising new questions about national

identities.
The Iberian colonizers used a range of terms to describe every possible combination and degree of racial
mixture. As David Howard shows in his article on the Dominican Republic, such distinctions continue
there in somewhat different form today. Dominicans use a long list of terms to describe shades of skin color
and avoid the still derogatory word, negro. Kathleen Bond and Andrew J. de Groot Fernandes document a
similar situation in Brazil, where the ideal of “racial democracy” remains a myth to many Afro-Brazilians.
Pan-black movements are working to instill a sense of pride and common identity in this community.
Marian Goslinga picks up this theme in her review of the works of Maryse Conde, an important
Caribbean author. Goslinga traces the efforts of Caribbean intellectuals to develop theories of identity to
encompass their legacy of slavery and colonization. As a black woman in a geographically, culturally and
politically marginal world, Conde tackles interrelated issues of race, gender and class.
In Mexico, Ileana Schmidt-Dfaz de Leon discusses the government’s publication of free textbooks in
indigenous languages and their implications for Indian identity. This issue’s photo essay also examines cul
tural survival in a Mexican indigenous community. Children in an isolated Huichol Indian village in the
mountains of Jalisco offer us a glimpse of their world through their own photographs.
The United States and Canada continue to come to terms with their own racial histories. In the spring of
1999, Canada took a pioneering step toward autonomous government by indigenous peoples with the cre
ation of the Nunavut Territory in the Arctic northeast. Two articles discuss the issues involved in this deci
sion and the challenges the territory’s Inuit inhabitants face in the years ahead.
This issue also includes several reports on other topics with important consequences for the hemisphere.
Canadian researchers Jean F. Mayer and Thomas Legler share their observations as “international visitors”
during the summer 2000 Mexican elections. In the midst of widespread praise for the process that allowed
an opposition figure to defeat the decades-old hegemony of the PRI, they raise some significant questions
about Mexico’s electoral practices and their implications for democratic government. Democracy in Brazil is
the main focus of Mariano Magalhaes’s article on civic participation and the role played by civil society in
consolidating new democracies. Finally, FIUs Allan Rosenbaum and Cristina Rodrfguez-Acosta discuss the
importance of strengthening local government in Latin America and the reasons why commitment to this
goal has been fading in the last few years.
Thanks to all of the contributors who helped us put together this issue, sending us their work from as far
away as Scotland, Brazil and the Canadian Arctic. The wide scope of the articles reflects Hemispheres com
mitment to covering issues of importance throughout the Americas. I would like to extend my sincere
appreciation to Alisa Newman, managing editor, and Pedro Botta, publications coordinator at LACC, for
their never-ending commitment to Hemisphere over the years. This issue, in particular, carries the imprint of
their dedication to this magazine and the intellectual curiosity that drives them to produce each issue.
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A Partial Victory
by Jean F. Mayer and Thomas Legler

The months preceding Election Day were
generally characterized by “business as
usual”: a continuation of decades-old meth
ods of intimidation and vote buying.

he July 2000 victory
of Vicente Fox of the
National Action Party
(PAN) was a water
shed in Mexican poli
tics, ending 71 years of govern
ment by the Institutional
Revolutionary Party (PRI). Both
in Mexico and abroad, politicians,
tinuation of decades-old methods
journalists and civil society repre
of intimidation and vote buying.
sentatives were quick to proclaim
Our own experience as interna
this contest the most free and fair
tional visitors on hand for the elec
Mexican suffrage ever. But the his
tions in the state of Puebla allowed
toric outcome of the election seems
us to verify these observations and
to have led most Mexican and for
add to them. In particular, we
eign observers to forget about— or
were struck by the extent of confu
worse, to ignore— the various diffi
sion among polling officials and
culties that characterized this latest
the resulting disorder at many of
electoral process. The prevailing
the voting stations we visited.
attitude seems to be that Fox’s vic
Ignorance of voting procedures
tory and the relative cleanliness of
appeared widespread among both
the voting process are enough to
polling officials and the electorate,
complete Mexico’s transition to
contributing to a large number of
democracy.
irregularities in the voting process
While we share much of the
and compromising the secrecy of
enthusiasm surrounding the elec
the vote. We were also able to wit
tions, we believe that the aggregate
ness firsthand indications of alleged
electoral trends and outcome at the
vote buying and coercion before
national level hide significant and
and during the process. These
more substantive problems that are
findings lead us to conclude that,
profoundly anchored in the coun
while the 2 0 0 0 elections represent
try’s political regime and socioeco
ed an important advance over pre
nomic system. These problems
vious electoral contests, Mexico
emerge most clearly in the Mexican
still faces significant challenges in
countryside, especially in remote
its path toward electoral democra
areas with a high concentration of
cy.
indigenous population. In these
zones, pre-electoral reports by such
T h e V o t e in P u e b l a
groups as Alianza Ci'vica, the
Our group was comprised of five
National Democratic Institute, the
academics from Southern Ontario,
Mexico Working Group and
Canada. We attended the 2000
Global Exchange indicated that the
elections as international visitors
months preceding Election Day
invited by Alianza Ci'vica—a
were generally characterized by
Mexican non-governmental organi
“business as usual”; that is, a con

T
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zation dedicated to promoting free
dom and secrecy in the voting
process as well as civic education—
and duly accredited with the
Federal Electoral Institute (IFE).
We stayed in Mexico for 10 days,
focusing our observation effort on
two mountainous areas of the cen
tral state of Puebla: the Sierra
Norte and the Zone of the
Volcanoes, the communities
around the Popocatepetl and
Iztacci'huatl peaks. We observed
the elections in a select group of
predominantly indigenous and
rural communities, including
Tahitic in the Sierra Norte, and
San Nicolas de los Ranchos,
Santiago Xalitzintla, San Pedro
Yancuitlapan and San Mateo
Ozolco in the Zone of the
Volcanoes. In both areas we visit
ed, the voting was characterized by
numerous irregularities and a gen
eral lack of understanding of the
electoral process, from both casilla
(voting station) officials and voters
at large. Voting secrecy was repeat
edly compromised as a result.
On Election Day, none of the
voting stations we observed opened
on time— 8 : 0 0 a.m., as stipulated
by electoral law—because of orga
nizational problems. In fact, the
first few hours of voting were
marked by near pandemonium.

R

T

S

Mexicans voted the PRI out of office, but electoral
irregularities persist
Casilla officials were nervous and
uncertain of the proper procedure
for beginning the electoral process,
and long lines of voters crowded
the voting stations. Officials
encountered many difficulties in
assembling the voting booths and
ballot boxes, as well as in unpack
ing and preparing voting materials.
In some cases they allowed voting
to begin even though the casilla
was clearly not ready to receive vot
ers.
Many illiterate or semi-literate
voters were unsure how to vote and
often did not receive proper
instructions from casilla officials.
After leaving the voting booth and
before depositing their ballots,
many people either openly exhibit
ed their votes or left their ballots
unfolded in clear view of
bystanders. Generally, PRI party
representatives were the closest to
the ballot boxes and made note of
voters’ choices. On numerous
occasions, two people entered the
voting booth at the same time and
communicated with each other. In
several other instances, people out
side the booths conversed at will
with voters inside, sometimes
instructing them directly on how
to vote.
Such irregularities may be attrib
uted to a lack of civic education or
cultural elements, but they can also
be interpreted as being part of a
process of vote buying or intimida
tion. We estimate that more than
half of the ballots cast in the Sierra
Norte and close to 20% in the
Zone of the Volcanoes were visible
to onlookers. In all cases, voting
station officials or district IFE rep

resentatives—when the latter were
present— made little attempt to
enforce voting secrecy.
Confidentiality was also compro
mised when strong winds lifted the
protective curtain on flimsy voting
booths located outside. On one
occasion, the wind blew an entire
booth away__
Many voting officials were clearly
following directions and sugges
tions from PRI party representa
tives. Often, a PRI representative,
instead of IFE officials, instructed
voters to fold their ballots and put
them in the ballot boxes. The
effect was to cast doubt on the
integrity of the voting process.
Despite the legal limit of two
political party representatives per
voting station, the PRI often had
many more affiliates in and around
the casillas. We noticed PRI mem
bers and sympathizers sitting much
too close to both the voting booths
and ballot boxes, making it possi
ble for them to see inside the
booth and observe how people
voted. These individuals were
supervised by a PRI official who
coordinated the activities of the
party’s representatives at voting sta
tions in the area. In the Sierra
Norte, this person claimed to be
part of Antorcha Campesina, a
hard-line faction of the Mexican
Peasant Confedera-tion, itself a sec
tor of the PRI. Against this com
manding local priista presence,
there was generally only one PAN
representative at each voting sta
tion, and the Party of the
Democratic Revolution (PRD) had
only a sporadic presence. Other
parties were not represented.

The counting of the ballots was
generally disorganized but fair,
although in Santiago Xalitzintla
serious errors occurred in the tabu
lation of the vote. There, PRI and
PAN party representatives were
allowed to participate in the count
ing of ballots as well as handle them
and instruct casilla officials about
the process—a practice strictly for
bidden by electoral law. Only the
timely arrival of an IFE district offi
cial allowed the vote count to con
clude.
Two incidents confirmed that the
elections in these communities
occurred in a context of pressure
and intimidation. First, in an ageold practice dubbed operation tamal,
PRI supporters in Santiago
Xalitzintla and San Nicolas de los
Ranchos passed out free breakfasts
and lunches to casilla officials and
voters. Second, and of even more
concern, we received compelling
evidence of coaction y compra, or
vote buying and coercion. Three
peasants approached us in Santiago
Xalitzintla to make a formal denun
ciation, alleging that in 250 cases
they knew of (roughly a third of the
electorate in that municipality),
benefits from the government social
assistance program PROGRESA
had been conditioned on voting for
the PRI. They complained that
local PROGRESA officials had
removed voter identification cards
two weeks earlier and returned
them just before Election Day after
telling their owners that their names
and voter numbers had been record
ed to keep track of how they voted.
In addition to the troubling issues
it raises, this episode confirms the
Hemisphere Volume 9, Number 3
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Reports: Mexico

The irregularities we witnessed in Puebla
were replicated in other regions of Mexico,
where they were sometimes much worse. In
the state of Chiapas, for example, delega
tions from US and Canadian NGOs were
forcibly prevented from entering villages,
received threats to their personal security,
and were harassed by local police and para
military forces.
usefulness of international
observers—a subject of much
debate lately. At the beginning of
our trip to Mexico, one high-rank
ing Canadian official stated that
foreign observers would have little
impact on the elections and that
their presence was hardly necessary
in the light of the tremendous pro
cedural improvements recorded by
the IFE in recent years. Our expe
rience, however, suggests the con
trary. In the case of the alleged
PROGRESA abuses, the men who
approached us clearly did not trust
the local PRI-controlled authori
ties. They would probably never
have reported this serious irregular
ity without our presence.
C

o n t in u in g

O

bstacle s

In many ways, what we saw in
Puebla contrasted with the national
context. For example, voter
turnout was less than 50% at the
casillas we visited-—an abstention
rate much higher than the 35%
national average. Also, in the vot
ing stations we observed, the PRI
candidates for the presidency,
Senate and Chamber of Deputies
won by a margin of at least 2 : 1 ,
whereas at the national level, the
PAN decisively won the presidency
Hemisphere Volume 9, Number 3

and made a strong showing in both
houses of Congress. (The IFE’s
final results showed the PAN-led
coalition with 39.5% of the con
gressional vote, the PRI with
37.4%, and the PRD-led alliance
with 19.2%).
However, the irregularities we
witnessed in Puebla were replicated
in other regions of Mexico, where
they were sometimes much worse.
In the state of Chiapas, for exam
ple, delegations from US and
Canadian NGOs were forcibly pre
vented from entering villages,
received threats to their personal
security, and were harassed by local
police and paramilitary forces.
Based on our observations during
this and previous stays, as well as
on the pre-electoral reports men
tioned above, we have identified
three main concerns regarding the
Mexican electoral process. The
first involves vote buying and coer
cion. The traditional practice of
using public funds to support the
electoral campaigns of political par
ties in power continues and
appears to involve all three major
political formations. A special
commission of the Chamber of
Deputies formed to investigate the
problem received 145 documented

denunciations of alleged misuse of
public monies. In addition, an
Alianza Ci'vica survey corroborated
pre-electoral coercive practices that
targeted public employees, obliging
them to participate in PRI cam
paign events.
A second concern is the lack of
basic and civic education in many
rural areas. Inadequate training of
casilla officials, widespread igno
rance of voting procedures among
both polling officials and the elec
torate, and the low level of basic lit
eracy in many indigenous and/or
rural communities contributed to
produce confusion, disorder and
numerous procedural irregularities.
Finally, access to the media
remains an important issue.
Studies by the IFE and Alianza
Ci'vica found national media cover
age to be imbalanced, denying
equal access and objective coverage
to all parties.
Underscoring these irregularities
and procedural problems is not
meant to detract from the signifi
cant advances made in Mexico’s
transition to democracy. Beginning
in 1977, and especially during the
1990s, numerous electoral reforms
facilitated the development of polit
ical pluralism and improved the
conditions conducive to free and
fair elections. Since 1996, when it
became fully autonomous and
operational, the IFE’s role in pro
moting free and fair elections has
been widely recognized in and out
side Mexico, and polls show that
most Mexicans today believe that
elections are an important mecha
nism for democratic development.
The 2000 electoral process high
lighted the tremendous work
accomplished in the past few years
by the IFE, as well as by the
numerous Mexican NGOs devoted
to the cause of free and fair voting,
civic education and citizen partici
pation in the political process.

Reports: Mexico

Clearly, Mexico’s electoral process
has undergone significant improve
ments since the controversial 1988
elections. Voter registration, the
impartiality of electoral institu
tions, the counting of votes, plural
ism of political groups, and alter
nation among political parties have
all become generally reliable and
effective. Nonetheless, numerous
elements still require improvement
for Mexico to have truly free, fair
and transparent elections.
R em arks

an d

R

e c o m m e n d a t io n s

Fox’s victory has already generat
ed significant political change in
Mexico, not least the painful and
much-debated restructuring of the
PRI and PRD. Nevertheless, the
country’s transition to a reliable,
effective electoral democracy
remains to be completed.
Important deficiencies in the
Mexican electoral process persist,
despite significant improvements
over the past 20 years. We believe
that the government, political par
ties, electoral authorities and civil
society must address such deficien
cies before future elections for
Mexico truly to accomplish its
transition to an electoral democraCy'
In particular, our observations
confirmed the persistent urban/
rural divide in Mexico. Elections
in Mexico’s cities generally have
become routine and reliable exer
cises in suffrage. In the country
side, however, especially in margin
al, indigenous zones, election pro
cedures are less dependable.
Problems range from poorly
trained and educated voting offi
cials and voters to vote buying and
intimidation.
For electoral democracy to
extend adequately to rural Mexico,
significant changes must be made
on two fronts. First, improvements
in education and training are cru

cial. Current civic and political
education programs, such as the
ones undertaken by the IFE and
Alianza Ci'vica, should be extended
to rural and indigenous communi
ties, where this type of training is
particularly lacking. Greater efforts
must be made to ensure that basic
general and civic education reaches
rural and/or indigenous communi
ties, and the communication gap
between indigenous languages and
the current IFE training programs,
which are predominantly in
Spanish, must be breached. On
the one hand, the IFE must reori
ent its spending priorities toward
rural civic education and election
training. We were struck, for
example, by the contrast between
the resources the IFE dedicated to
such activities as hosting interna
tional visitors or launching ad cam
paigns and its weak presence in
rural zones. On the other hand, the
Secretariat of Public Education
must renew efforts to expand liter
acy in Mexico’s poorer rural zones.
Second, advances in electoral
democracy in the countryside are
impeded by persistent and unacceptably high levels of poverty.
Poverty, ultimately, is the feeding
ground of an anti-democratic polit
ical culture of clientelism manifest
ed in fear, vote buying and intimi
dation. During the 71 years of
PRI rule, voting in poor areas
became a question of survival.
Election time represented a period
ic opportunity for impoverished
voters to exchange their votes for
concrete material benefits from the
ruling party, ranging from cash,
agricultural credit and debt forgive
ness to building supplies and rural
electrification. In the 2000 elec
tion, the PROGRESA and PROCAMPO social assistance programs
continued the tradition of exchang
ing votes for goods and services.
The PRI will relinquish the pres

idency in December 2000, but the
party retains much of its strength
at the state and local levels. In
addition, both the PAN and PRD
have recently come under allega
tions of manipulating state-run
programs and public monies in the
states and municipalities under
their control. One of the most
important challenges for Fox’s
administration will be to thwart
the use of state patronage and coer
cion by political parties and
caciques (local bosses). To achieve
these goals, basic and civic educa
tion must be improved dramatical
ly and poverty alleviated substan
tially, especially in rural areas.
These problems are complex and
will require long-term strategies
and commitment on the part of
the federal government. Unless the
social and economic condition of
Mexico’s poor population is
improved significantly in the next
few years, the irregularities we
observed in the July 2000 elections
are likely to reoccur in the future.
Much work remains to be done
before electoral democracy is effec
tively consolidated in Mexico. ■

Jean F. M ayer is assistant professor o f
political science at the University o f
Guelph, Ontario. Thomas Legler is
assistant professor o f political science
at the University o f Victoria, British
Columbia. This article is based on a
report originally prepared with the
help ofN ibaldo Galleguillos, Mark
Juhasz, M arie-Josee Massicotte and
Erin McCaughan.
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Reports: Local Governance

Building Partnerships
by Allan Rosenbaum and Cristina Rodriguez-Acosta
become weaker. Rather, contempo
rary experience demonstrates clearly
that when one level of government
becomes institutionally stronger and
more competent, other existing levels
will inevitably do the
1998
Summit of government
the
same.
Americas in Santiago,
One of the most important bene
Chile, local governance
fits of stronger subnational govern
was high on the agenda. The Plan of
ments is their ability to generate eco
Action signed by the leaders of the
nomic development at the local level.
34 participating countries included
Successful economic development
several objectives designed to
requires locally focused and targeted
strengthen local government, reflect
support to establish necessary infra
ing the Summit’s recognition of the
structure and create an environment
growing significance of local govern
conducive to economic development.
ment in Latin America and the
This is achieved much more readily
important role it can play in devel
by officials on the scene, who are
opment. In the past few years, how
located in the community and pos
ever, this growth has shown signs of
sess the autonomy and the resources
reversing, or at least slowing down.
to respond to the legitimate develop
Across the hemisphere, countries are
ment needs of the private sector.
witnessing a decline in commitment
This relationship becomes clear if
to strong, efficient and productive
one examines the data on levels of
subnational governments.
subnational expenditure and employ
Ironically, this trend comes in the
ment on a regional basis around the
aftermath of widespread praise for
world. In Europe, Japan and North
Latin America’s progress in the area
America—the most economically
of local governance, an example that
developed regions of the world—
has been emulated in other parts of
56% of all governmental expenditure
the world. Eastern Europe, Africa
and public employment occurs at the
and even China are turning their
subnational level. In contrast, in
attention to questions of decentral
Africa—the least economically
ization and building the capacity of
developed region of the world—only
their subnational governments. In so
6 % to 1 0 % of government employ
doing, they are drawing inspiration
ment and expenditure occurs at the
from a Latin American model that,
subnational level. The figures are
at least for the moment, appears to
approximately 20% for Latin
be running out of steam. Some crit
America and 30% for Asia. Thus, it
ics, especially those in national gov
is not surprising that the country in
ernments, seem to believe that
Eastern Europe credited with the
stronger local governments come at
most successful economic transition
the expense of weaker national gov
is the same one that has devoted the
ernments. This argument fails to
most attention to building and
understand that strengthening one or
strengthening the capacity of its sub
another level of government does not
represent a zero sum game, in the
sense that if one level of government
Hemisphere Volume 9, Number 3
is enhanced, another will inevitably
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mong the many issues
under discussion at the

national governments: Poland. Nor
is it surprising that when the now
vibrant Swedish economy began to
take a downturn a decade ago, a
main focus of reform efforts was
enhancing the capacity of Sweden’s
already strong subnational govern
ments.
Of special importance for develop
ing countries, the strengthening of
subnational governments (and, by
extension, local economic develop
ment capacity) may also be a signifi
cant step in dealing with the growing
problem of income inequality, which
the Inter-American Development
Bank’s 1999 annual development
report identified as among the most
potentially destabilizing forces in
Latin America and the Caribbean.
Locally elected officials, who are
dependent upon local voters, must,
of necessity, be responsive to the
most basic needs of their communi
ties.
Despite these clear benefits,
reformers who support the move
ment toward stronger subnational
government in the hemisphere
recently have encountered a growing
disinclination on the part of national
governments to adequately and effec
tively support the strengthening of
government at this level. In fact,
national officials seem to have been a
good deal more committed to
strengthening local government a
decade ago than they are today. One
possible reason for this trend is the
recent tendency of reformers con
cerned about these matters to focus
almost exclusively on the activities of
local officials in encouraging the
development of subnational govern
ments, instead of working jointly at
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the local and national levels. In most
cases, one cannot build subnational
governments simply by working in
the subnational context. This is
especially true in countries with long
traditions of centralism, where politi
cal, economic and administrative
power is concentrated at the national
level.
The growing tendency of reform
ers to ignore the need for an active
role for the national government,
and the growing inclination of
national governments to lessen their
commitment to strengthening
administration at the local level, is in
part a result of prior success and its
political consequences. Many local
governments—especially, large capi
tal city governments—have become
important political bases in their
own right. In some cases, most
recently Argentina, the mayors of
capital cities have successfully run for
president as opposition candidates.
Those realities should not encour
age reformers to neglect efforts to
maintain a partnership between local
and national officials. In most
instances, the national government
not only establishes the policy frame
work within which local govern
ments must function, but also exer
cises overwhelming control over the
fiscal resources available to govern
ment at all levels. If progress in the
development of subnational govern
ments is to continue, a renewed
effort must be made to encourage
and engage national leadership. An
important part of these efforts is
stressing the economic development
role of local governments.
Efforts to strengthen local govern
ment have also failed to focus ade
quately on issues of sustainability.
International organizations and
donors must bear some portion of
the responsibility. All too often,
donors tend to support short-term
reform projects that can produce
quick results. Our personal experi

ence as advisors to the local govern
ment of one Latin American city is a
case in point. Two separate mayors
attempted to reform that city’s budg
etary and financial management pro
cedures. In each case, the effort was
supported by a different internation
al donor, and in each instance the
results were the same: Short-term
assistance was provided for major
reforms that rapidly enhanced man
agement capacity and dramatically
tightened executive control over
agency spending. The donor then
ended assistance. Shortly thereafter,
the reforms put in place evaporated
amidst political and fiscal pressures
on the municipal government. A
short-term focus fails to recognize
that serious systemic reform requires
a great deal of time. In the United
States, for example, systematic efforts
at encouraging local government
reform and professionalization began
in the 1880s, but real success was
not achieved on a broad basis until
the 1950s. Attempts to professional
ize the civil service and eliminate
patronage in the US have taken at
least as long to achieve.
A related problem is the tendency
of donors and international assis
tance agencies to provide mostly
short-term training for local officials.
Less support is granted for longerterm professionalization, such as the
development of university-based pro
grams in local government manage
ment. Longer-term programs are
essential for the development of a
permanent culture of professional
ism.
Finally, those who support reform
efforts (in particular, international
organizations and donors) tend to
forget that the kind of change that is
needed goes well beyond administra
tive and fiscal concerns but is, in
fact, political as well. It is necessary
to work with the political leadership
both nationally and locally to bring
about important, meaningful and

sustainable change. Perhaps because
so much international technical assis
tance and support is overseen by
mid-level administrators and man
agers, technical assistance efforts tend
to work at similar levels in the coun
tries where activities are supported.
In many cases there is, below the sur
face, a very real antagonism toward
working with political officials—
even at the local level. Often, donor
officials will publicly heap praise on
the results of projects that support
local government, while at the same
time privately criticizing the projects
for having had too much contact
with high-level political officials and,
as a consequence, assuming too high
a profile.
Especially in Latin America and
the Caribbean, the kind of long-term
changes that are necessary to imple
ment the goals of the Summit Plan
of Action require the full involve
ment of top-level political officials.
This involvement cannot be
obtained by ignoring or avoiding
these officials in the process of seek
ing meaningful institutionalized
reform. Rather, efforts must be
made to engage political leadership
at all levels in not only supporting,
but being a part of—and indeed,
even leading—this process. ■

Allan Rosenbaum and Cristina
Rodriguez-Acosta are director and
deputy director, respectively, o f the
Institute fo r Public M anagement and
Community Service at Florida
International University’s College o f
Health and Urban Affairs. This arti
cle is based on a report originally sub
mitted to the Special Committee on
Inter-American Summits Management
o f the Permanent Council o f the
Organization o f American States.
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Civic Participation in Brazil
by Mariano J. Magalhaes
decade and a half after
the massive popular
uprising in favor of
direct presidential elec
tions (the diretasjd
movement), and despite the impres
sive “March of 100,000” on Brasilia
in August 1999, Brazilian citizens
have a low rate of participation in
political life. The strength of civil
society will not make or break
democracy in Brazil, but anemic
popular participation in associations,
movements and organizations lessens
the quality of representative democ
racy there.
Many scholars have argued that a
strong civil society makes for a
strong democracy. In countries
around the world, civil society often
provides the force behind the initial
decision of authoritarian regimes to
move toward democracy or pick up
the pace of democratic reform.
Brazil is only one example of this
trend. Popular uprisings in
Indonesia in early 1998 led to the
fall of the Suharto regime; grass-roots
movements in the early 1990s pres
sured the Mexican government to
make elections more open and com
petitive; the Eastern European demo
cratic transitions were in part spurred
by social forces; and in the late 1970s
and into the 1980s, the Madres de la
Plaza de Mayo kept the heat on
Argentina’s military government to
come clean on its deadly campaign
to wipe out subversive movements
during that country’s “dirty war.”
The level at which the population
participates in organized collective
action greatly impacts the quality of
democracy. Although levels of popu
lar participation can be expected to

A

shift over time in response to
changes in the substance and intensi
ty of societal conflict, as well as the
stage of democratization, widespread
participation in a rich set of associa
tions and organizations enables peo
ple to advance their interests in the
political arena. The process of dem
ocratic consolidation, however,
marks the point at which the politi
cal system begins to settle into more
routinized patterns of conflict that
encourage individuals to “free-ride”
on the efforts of others. Scholars
expect to find decreased popular par
ticipation in associational life in most
newly democratic states, and that is
certainly the case in Brazil.
M

e m b e r s h i p in

A s s o c ia t i o n s

Brazilian associations have experi
enced a general decline in member
ship since the mid 1980s, the high
point of political participation. In
1985, a survey conducted by the
Universidade Federal do Rio Grande
do Sul found that almost 40% of
adult residents of that Brazilian state
were members of at least one associa
tion. Nine years later, the number
had declined to less than 30%.
Although the sample came from a
single state, the results have mostly
been confirmed across the country.
The major reason for the weakness
of civil society in Brazil is the inabili
ty of the vast number of uneducated
poor to articulate their demands
effectively. In northeastern Brazil,
especially, the level of participation of
poor residents in neighborhood and
church-based organizations has
declined significantly since the
1970s. The northeast is the poorest
region in Brazil and has suffered

tremendously since market reforms
were introduced in the early 1990s.
Income distribution, already skewed
in favor of the rich, grew even more
unequal in the first half of that
decade. The educational level also
declined, making it easy to under
stand decreased participation in poli
tics in general, and associations in
particular.
More surprising are the survey data
from Rio Grande do Sul, one of
Brazil’s most developed states.
Although it also suffered the negative
short-term consequences of national
economic reforms, Rio Grande do
Sul saw its share of the national eco
nomic wealth increase from 1 0 % in
1985 to 12% in 1995. Educational
levels have remained constant since
the 1980s. The decline in associa
tional life in this state seems to fit
the prediction that after the euphoria
of the transition to civilian govern
ment, people in neodemocracies
begin to settle into their new lives
and are less likely to join associa
tions.
Aside from the importance of
political participation for democratic
governance, many scholars argue that
membership in associations fosters
democratic attitudes. According to
this logic, strengthening civil society
is tantamount to deepening demo
cratic political culture. We can test
this theory by examining whether
Brazilians who are members of asso
ciations exhibit more democratic
attitudes than Brazilians who are not
affiliated with any association.
The sample of interviews from Rio
Grande do Sul provides some evi
dence for the positive connection
between membership in associations
Hemisphere Volume 9, Number 3
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(1994)

Member

Nonmember

I influence politics

44

30**

I trust our system of justice

29

23

The country would be better
off with only one political party

39

55**

Things will only get better with
a revolution or through violence

30

27

Voting is very important

83

75*

Under military rule the
country was better off

40

4 5 **

N=609
Source: N ticleo d e Pesquisas e Documenta^ao da P olitica Rio Grandense, U niversidade Federal
do Rio Grande do Sul. I w ou ld like to thank Professor M arcelo Baquero f o r this data.
* sign ifican t a t . 1 lev el (tw o-tail test)
** sign ifican t a t .01 lev el (ttvo-tail test)

and democratic norms. The survey
revealed a sizable (and statistically
significant) difference between mem
bers and nonmembers in terms of
perceived political efficacy. Of the
entire sample, only a third of the
respondents believed that they influ
enced politics. The implication was
that most Brazilians believed that
nothing much had changed after
more than 1 0 years of democratic
elections. Corruption was more
widespread, if anything, and only
one in every 1 0 gauchos (residents of
Rio Grande do Sul) trusted elected
officials. Despite changing economic
fortunes beginning in summer 1994,
citizens were skeptical of the options
available to them in the upcoming
elections, and probably of the elec
tions themselves.
Effective and stable democratic
Hemisphere Volume 9, Number 3

government hinges in part on the
level of confidence in state institu
tions. The lack of trust in the
Brazilian judicial system reported in
the Rio Grande do Sul survey by
both members and nonmembers of
associations should come as no sur
prise. Historically, the judicial
branch in Brazil has enjoyed very lit
tle public support. More often than
not, the politically well placed and
economically well off receive a slap
on the wrist, if they are brought to
justice at all. The absence of the rule
of law in Brazil is a key obstacle to
democratic consolidation. Citizens
need to know that they can turn to
the courts to defend themselves
against the state, its officials and
other powerful actors. The survey
found even lower levels of public
trust in the police: 15% and 1 2 %,

respectively, for members and non
members. This lack of confidence in
public institutions at the local and
national levels threatens the quality
of democracy in Brazil.
Preference for a multiparty system
varied between the two groups of
respondents. Less then half of gau
chos who were members of associa
tions felt that the country would be
better served by a one-party system,
compared to more than half of non
members. The preference for more
parties among members of associa
tions may be explained in part by the
fact that associational life produces
awareness of the importance of open
competition for public power and
the proper functioning of democratic
government. Of the entire sample,
50% supported a one-party system.
In a study published in the
American Political Science Review in
September 1994, Edward Muller and
Mitchell Seligson found that public
support for gradual reform has a
greater positive impact on change in
democracy than does support for
revolutionary change or intransigent
defense of the status quo. They also
found that public support for grad
ual reform is positively correlated
with other democratic attitudes.
Therefore, associational life should
have a negative impact on support
for violent change. In Rio Grande
do Sul, this was not the case.
Associational membership in the
sample was correlated (albeit not sig
nificantly) with greater support for
political change through violent
means. The data suggest that partic
ipation in civil society does not influ
ence whether individuals will prefer
incremental change over revolution
ary change or defense of the status
quo.
In an earlier round of interviews in
Rio Grande do Sul in 1985, respon
dents were asked whether quebraquebras (activities such as overturning
vehicles and arson) were acceptable
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means for confronting public
authorities. Almost 90% answered
no. How can the difference between
1985 and 1994 be explained? One
possibility is that the expectations
and euphoria associated with the
transition to democracy convinced
most people that these actions were
unnecessary. A second potential
explanation for the change between
1985 and 1994 is the wording of
the question. In the later question
naire, respondents were not provid
ed with examples of violent methods
for seeking political change.
Without visualizing the options,
respondents may have been more
likely to condone violent upheaval.
A third possibility that follows the
chronological logic of the first is that
the inept government of Jose Sarney,
the corruption of Fernando Collor
de Melo and the incompetence of
Itamar Franco—not to mention the
generalized perception that democ
racy, mainly elections, had not done
much to improve most people’s
lives—could have fueled the belief
that positive change would only be
possible through “nondemocratic”
means. These explanations are not
mutually exclusive and may in fact
have worked together to account for
the change between surveys.
A further concern in consolidating
democracy is a healthy attitude
toward voting. If public regard for
voting reaches very low levels, voting
will decline to the point that the
ability of society to hold elected offi
cials accountable is seriously under
mined. In Brazil, voting is manda
tory. This may account for the
results in the table above, in which
both members and nonmembers
considered voting to be very impor
tant (although the rate was higher
among members than nonmem
bers). To dismiss this hypothesis,
respondents in Rio Grande do Sul
were asked if they would vote even if
they were not required to do so.

More than 70% of members said
yes, compared to 63% of nonmem
bers. The results underline the
importance of voting in the eyes of
the public, as well as confirming the
difference between members and
nonmembers.
The survey also looked at public
support for military rule; specifically,
whether the country was better or
worse off during this period. This
question captures Samuel
Huntington’s notion of “authoritari
an nostalgia,” which he claims actu
ally increases the prospects for dem
ocratic consolidation. One can
argue that longing for a nondemoc
ratic regime is not good for demo
cratic political socialization. If citi
zens do not perceive democracy as
the most appropriate form of gov
ernment before “procedural” legiti
macy sets in, antidemocratic
forces—the military, in most Latin
American countries—are likely to
take this cue and perhaps intervene
more openly in politics, to the detri
ment of the democratic allocation of
public values. Members could be
expected to have a more negative
evaluation of military rule than non
members, and in fact, 40% of mem
bers reported that the country was
better off under the military, com
pared to almost half of nonmem
bers.
Two factors stand out in the data.
First, although this information was
not included in the table, one-fifth
of nonmembers were unsure about
which regime was better for the
country, compared to less than 1 0 %
of members. This finding may be
spurious; lack of education may con
tribute to the uncertainty of non
members, while conversely, member
ship in associational life is highly
correlated with education.
The second outstanding factor is
the high level of agreement that the
country was better off under mili
tary rule. Although it would be a

leap to imply that the respondents
preferred military rule to democracy,
the survey’s findings corroborate the
conclusions of other studies. Juan
Linz and Alfred Stepan found that
in the early 1990s, Brazilians sup
ported democracy at a frighteningly
lower rate than citizens of other
countries studied. Forty percent of
Brazilians preferred democracy to
any other form of government, com
pared to 73% of Uruguayans, 70%
of Spaniards, 61% of Portuguese
and 87% of Greeks.
C

i v il

S o c ie t y

Civil society in Brazil is weak.
The lack of associational life in Rio
Grande do Sul is particularly telling;
given this state’s characteristics, we
could expect it to have higher rates
of participation. In a presentation at
a conference in Brasilia in December
1998, political scientist Philip
Oxhorn told the audience that the
key to the health of Brazilian
democracy was a strong civil society.
In practice, however, civil society
organizations in Brazil are con
strained by a lack of available
resources. The situation will not
improve significantly without a
helping hand from the government.
Strengthening civil society in
Brazil will require a more serious
commitment on the part of
President Fernando Henrique
Cardoso and the help of a national
legislature that has been reluctant to
go along with the president’s propos
als since his re-election in October
1998. The challenge for Brazil’s
leaders is to overcome partisan
squabbles to create a legal and social
environment more conducive to citi
zen participation. ■

Mariano J. Magalha.es is assistant pro
fessor o f political science at Roosevelt
University.
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Black Into...Black
by Kathleen Bond

I

n 1997, Margarida Pereira da
Silva was the leading candi
date for mayor of Pombal, a
city in the interior of the
northeastern Brazilian state of
Parafba. Pereira da Silva, beloved
for her community work with
youth, decided to run for office to
offer an alternative to corrupt, spe
cial interest politics. She had little
money, so she ran the campaign
from her home. One week before
Election Day, two strangers offered
her the equivalent of $ 7 5 , 0 0 0 as a
donation for her youth program.
There was just one condition— she
had to drop out of the race. She
politely but firmly refused, telling
the visitors, “I’m running for my
people, not for money.”
Days after she refused the bribe,
all of Pereira da Silva’s campaign
posters were painted over with the
words nega feia (ugly black
woman). Unable to discredit her
honesty or merits, her opponents
orchestrated a smear campaign that
focused solely on race. Long-time
friends and even some relatives,
who she believes were paid off, sud
denly turned against her. Her
nephew caught his girlfriend tear
ing down Pereira da Silva’s posters.
When he confronted her, the girl
replied, “I’m not going to waste my
vote on that ugly black thing.”
Pereira da Silva lost by a landslide.
Stories of racial discrimination
like this one are not confined to the
rural northeast. Millions of AfroBrazilians experience racism every
day. From the family living room,
where lighter-skinned children are
The lack o f educational materials about Afro-Brazilian history an d culture rein
often favored over their darker sib
forces
negative images o f blackness am ong school children. Photo: Kathleen Bond.
lings, to church pews, barbershops,
14
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The battle over racial identity in Brazil
Brazil is often described as a “racial democ
racy” because of the high number of interra
cial marriages and easy banter between the
races in everyday life. Nothing could be far
ther from the truth.
classrooms and the halls of
Congress, racism gnaws at the fab
ric of Brazilian society. The coun
try is often described by foreigners
and Brazilians as a “racial democra
cy” because of the high number of
interracial marriages and seemingly
easy banter between the races in
everyday life. Nothing could be
farther from the truth.
A Legacy

of

D

is c r im in a t io n

Racial democracy, a term coined
by Brazilian sociologist Gilberto
Freyre in the early twentieth centu
ry, is the theory that Brazil’s history
of extended miscegenation has
resulted in a cultural melange in
which all races are equally valued.
In reality, however, race in Brazil is
a complex and difficult issue.
Although most Brazilians claim a
mixed African, European and
indigenous ancestry, the weight of
racism causes many to “whiten”
themselves. Many morenos straight
en their hair and search for lighter
skinned marriage partners. They
often identify themselves and each
other with terms that indicate a
lighter skin tone, such as
moreninho, cafe , mulato, bronzeado
and escurinho. Rarely will they
describe themselves as negro. Even

those who call themselves black
often have a hard time convincing
other Brazilians not to identify
them as moreno or mulato. For
many people, to be called black is
still an insult.
Skin color profoundly influences
life chances. According to a 1992
study by Carlos Hasenbalg and
Nelson do Valle Silva, nonwhite
Brazilian are three times more likely
than whites to be illiterate. The
numbers deteriorate even further at
higher educational levels: Whites
are five times more likely than peo
ple of mixed ancestry and nine
times more likely than blacks to
obtain university degrees. The pat
tern repeats itself in the work force,
where, according to government
statistics, whites have access to the
highest-paying jobs, earning up to
75% more than blacks and 50%
more than people of mixed ances
try. Other socioeconomic indica
tors are no less grim. Infant mor
tality statistics are almost twice as
high for nonwhite children, and the
vast majority of detainees in the
country’s crowded prison system are
nonwhites.
Not all of the consequences of
racism can be neatly packaged into
statistics and charts. Effects on self

esteem are not so easily measured.
At a recent reflection group of
Afro-Brazilian women in Joao
Pessoa, the capital of Parafba, a
woman named Cida painfully
recounted the end of her relation
ship with Chico, a lighter-skinned
black. The two had dated for sev
eral years without their color differ
ence seeming to create any difficul
ties. When they got engaged, how
ever, Chico’s family exploded.
“This little blackie is going to pol
lute our blood. Go and find some
one who will purify it,” Chico’s
mother raged. Chico caved in and
broke off the engagement within
days. Two years later, Cida painful
ly asked the group, “How can you
tell me not to feel inferior because
of my color?”
R e c l a i m i n g I d e n t it ie s

Brazil’s black movement struggles
to address this question by intro
ducing positive images of black
identity and fighting racism at all
levels of society. Anthropologist
John Burdick traces the movement’s
momentum to the 1970s, when a
generation of nonwhite students
was caught in the contradiction
between the promise of upward
mobility and the reality of labor
and educational barriers. Around
the world, revolutionaries in the
former Portuguese colonies of
Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and
Angola and militants in the Black
Power movement in the United
States offered encouraging symbols
of self-confidence for the fledgling
Afro-Brazilian movement.
Over the past 25 years, the black
movement in Brazil has developed
Hemisphere Volume 9, Number 3
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Paraiba Black M ovem ent participants celebrate the many shades o f their African heritage. Photo: Kathleen Bond.
in different directions. Some
groups dedicate their energy to
judicial and legislative arenas, such
as the enforcement of the 1989
Cao law that makes racism a crime.
Other organizations— including the
internationally acclaimed percus
sion band Olodum—focus on cul
tural programs. Various research
institutes, primarily in Rio de
Janeiro and Sao Paulo, cater to the
middle class, while Catholic church
groups, most notably the Agentes
de Pastoral Negro (Black Pastoral
Church Workers), offer educational
courses for the economically disad
vantaged.
The black movement in Parafba
reflects this diversity. Participating
organizations include Caiana dos
Crioulos, a black community of
Hemisphere Volume 9, Number 3

descendants of runaway slaves;
Banda Yle Odara and other musi
cal, martial arts and dance groups;
Afro-Brazilian religious groups,
including Candomble and
Umbanda centers; women’s reflec
tion groups; coalition and organiz
ing entities, including the Agentes
de Pastoral Negro; and educational
groups that focus on literacy pro
grams, training and school curricu
lum development. These groups
gather every year for the annual
Parafba Black Movement
Conference.
In addition to gaining new
insights into cultural, religious and
political resistance, coming together
in solidarity is an important aspect
of the conference. In rural regions
of Brazil, blacks are often isolated.

They suffer intense discrimination,
especially in the school system.
Paulo Cesar, a 26-year-old commu
nity activist, told a story that
echoed the childhood experiences
of many participants. His junior
high school in rural Parafba had
only three or four black students.
When he was called negao besta
(big, stupid black), his teacher
refused to intervene. His mother,
lacking formal education and selfconfidence, did nothing when he
came home from school crying.
“That experience left a profound
mark,” Cesar stated. “My involve
ment with the black movement
reinforces in me that being black is
not horrible, it’s being human like
any other person.” He now directs
a capoeira group (a combination of
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martial arts and dance practiced by
slaves to train for escapes) and holds
workshops on racism in local
schools.
Activists have reached out to the
interior of the state, where
Tanzanian Maryknoll Sister Efu
Nyaki and her Brazilian colleagues
travel extensively throughout the
drought-stricken, poor countryside
offering two-day formation courses
in identity, self-esteem and empow
erment. During these visits, Nyaki
discovered an abysmally low educa
tional level among most blacks in
the interior. “We’ve been to all
black rural communities where only
one or two people are literate, which
has led us to seek funding to begin
small literacy programs,” she com
mented.
Lagoa Rac^a, 10 hours from the
state capital, is one of those commu
nities. Five years ago, when Nyaki’s
team first visited the community, it
had no school within walking dis
tance. Only one of the 200 resi
dents could read and write. With
help from outside, that man was
trained to offer adult literacy cours
es, and eventually a school was built
to serve the community. “There are
Lagoa Ra^as all over the northeast,”
Nyaki lamented. “The government
has simply abandoned these people.”
Educational work is also under
way in urban areas of Parafba, where
activists such as Nyaki offer pro
grams on racism and Afro-Brazilian
identity in the schools. Very few
children admit to being black when
the question is posed at the begin
ning of the sessions. The complete
lack of educational material about
Afro-Brazilian history and culture
reinforces negative images of black
ness among school children. Nyaki’s
team is working with black universi
ty professors to develop a primary
school curriculum that includes the
history and achievements of black
Brazilians.

R e l ig io u s D
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Black activism has also affected
the church, bringing black mem
bers of religious orders together for
reflection. Parafba’s GRENI
(Group of Black and Indigenous
Religious) is one such group.
These small clusters of Catholic
priests and nuns are beginning the
process of reclaiming their black
and indigenous identities. Many
participants find strength in the
groups to face racism in their own
religious communities.
Catholics are not just talking to
each other about racial issues. Over
the last decade, some have attempt
ed a dialogue with Afro-Brazilian
religious groups. Many of these
groups have suffered discrimination
throughout Brazilian history, much
of it condoned by the Catholic
Church. For example, until the
1950s, acts of destruction against
Candomble houses of worship by
either the police or common citi
zens were never punished by law.
Long after the practice of AfroBrazilian religions was legalized in
the early 1970s, participants were
required to request permission from
local authorities on the day of wor
ship. To this day, many people dis
miss Afro-Brazilian religious sym
bols such as drums and colorful
vestments as coisas do diabo (the
devil’s things).
One of the first Catholics
involved in this inter-religious
effort was the late Combonian Fr.
Hector Frissoti, who began his
ministry by visiting the terreiros
(sacred Afro-Brazilian places of
worship). Frissoti published his
reflections, sharing his experiences
first with his own Comboni com
munity and later with the larger
Brazilian Catholic Church. The
issue reached the agenda of the
ninth annual meeting of InterEcclesiastical Base Community
Leaders in 1997, which brought

together 8000 participants, includ
ing 67 bishops, in Sao Luiz,
Maranhao. Supporters argued that
inter-religious dialogue and celebra
tions would be more inclusive of
the many Catholics who also
engage in Afro-Brazilian religious
practices. However, Frissoti and
others involved in the outreach
effort met resistance on both sides.
On the one hand, the bishops
feared that such contact would tar
nish the image of the Catholic
Church. On the other, some prac
titioners of Afro-Brazilian religions
also opposed the discussion, largely
because of their historic distrust of
the church. As Ana Rita Santiago,
a Candomble religious leader from
Bahia, noted, “I am wary of a
process that is limited to taking
some of our symbols and simply
incorporating them into the
Catholic Mass.”
Despite these concerns, Frissoti’s
spirit of reconciliation has had an
impact in Brazil. In April 2000,
during the commemorations of five
hundred years of Portuguese colo
nization in Brazil, the National
Conference of Brazilian Bishops
sought public forgiveness from
indigenous and black peoples for
not speaking out against injustices
committed against them. For
Nyaki, who has followed the
emerging dialogue for the last six
years, this is only the beginning.
“Public statements from church
leaders are a step,” she said, “but we
also ask that Brazilian Catholics
open their hearts and minds.” ■

Kathleen Bond, a Maryknoll lay mis
sioned works with women and
human rights issues in Jodo Pessoa,
Paraiba, Brazil. For more inform a
tion about M ary knoll's overseas activ
ities, contact Kathy Wright, MA1AF
Admissions, P.O. Box 307,
Maryknoll, NY 10545-0307,
www. maryknoll. org.
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The Mulatto Myth
Andrew J. de Groot Fernandes

A

fro-Brazilian activists
are struggling to
change how blacks
identify themselves.

In a culture that uses
a range of racial designations to
describe hair types and skin tones,
they are urging Brazilians of
African descent to embrace a pan
black identity. Noting that blacks
of all shades suffer similar obstacles
in a white-dominated society, the
campaigns attack the practice of
auto-em branquecim ento (self
whitening), encouraging those who
classify themselves as mulato , pardo
or moreno to identify as negro
instead.
These efforts challenge much of
the conventional scholarship on
race in Brazil. From the 1930s to
the 1970s, in particular, Brazilian
and foreign academics argued that
Afro-Brazilians of different colors
experienced markedly different
socioeconomic realities. Lighter
skinned blacks, they claimed, held
a status intermediate between their
disadvantaged darker-skinned com
patriots (pretos ) and more privi
leged whites. This situation was
said to contrast with the United
States, where anyone with a trace
of African heritage was assigned to
the dispossessed “black” group.
Thus far, the campaign to chal
lenge these notions has met with
limited success. Despite occasional
bursts of unity, significant colorbased cleavages continue to hinder
pan-black mobilization in Brazil.
Some observers cite the earlier
arguments and attribute the divi
sions to socioeconomic gaps among
blacks themselves. According to
Hemisphere Volume 9, Number 3

this view, better-off pardos would
have little to gain from political
unity with pretos. Closer examina
tion of the country’s history sug
gests an alternative explanation:
that the weakness of Afro-Brazilian
unity derives in part from elite
efforts to divide and dominate the
black masses, exaggerating preto
and pardo divisions to undermine
the threat of pan-black union.
R a c ia l D
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Powerful Brazilians have long
understood the benefits of disunity
among blacks. Luis dos Santos
Vilhena, a keen observer of late
eighteenth-century Brazilian socie
ty, argued that “if African slaves are
treacherous, creoles [Brazilian-born
pretos] and mulatos are even more
so ... if not for the rivalry between
the former and the latter, all politi
cal power and social order would
crumble before a servile revolt.”
Persistent fear of such a revolt and
recognition of the usefulness (to
elite dominance) of inter-black
rivalries contributed to the devel
opment of a “mulatto myth” as a
key component of twentieth-centu
ry Brazilian racial identity.
According to this myth, because of
their phenotypic and cultural
approximation to whites, pardos
hold themselves jealously above
darker-skinned blacks and are able
to secure for themselves a special
place within Brazil’s racial hierar
chy.
The mulatto myth has been
repeated so often that it may now
be impossible to determine its
exact origins, although the writings
of Gilberto Freyre, Arthur Ramos

and other Euro-Brazilian authors
in the 1930s certainly lent the idea
greater currency. A key moment in
its acceptance was the first AfroBrazilian Congress in 1934, the
aim of which, according to Ramos,
was to grant Brazilian blacks “the
scientific and human vindication
which could no longer be delayed.”
Two central ideas dominated the
proceedings: greater recognition
(by whites) of positive black contri
butions to Brazil, and modification
of Brazilian attitudes toward blackwhite miscegenation.
Controversial as it was then, this
“vindication” of blacks did not fun
damentally challenge old attitudes
about their proper “place” in socie
ty. Instead, it can be interpreted as
a skillful effort to foster national
harmony by an elite forced to
abandon slavery and the dream of
building a “white” society in the
Americas. Like their contempo
raries in other Latin American
countries, Brazilian intellectuals of
the early twentieth century sought
to redeem their nation’s image.
They searched for an ideology that
would boost confidence in their
largely nonwhite population with
out disturbing the balance of
power. The ingenious result was
“racial democracy”—the notion
that, unlike other societies founded
on race-based slavery, Brazil had
almost magically escaped the grip
of prejudice.
The mulatto myth was a critical
component of this ideology.
Pardos—hitherto despised—sud
denly became treasured symbols of
national identity. Brazilian intel
lectuals pointed to them as evi
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Historical lessons for contemporary Afro-Brazilian
identity
dence that, despite considerable
differences, Europeans and Africans
(and, less crucially by now, indige
nous peoples) had blended to form
a nation perfectly suited to a
unique, tropical, European civiliza
tion. This world view included no
proposals to improve blacks’ social
condition; instead, it was assumed
that the liberal Luso-Brazilian atti
tude toward race had already
brought many improvements— at
least for those blacks who were
light-skinned and well-behaved
enough. Because of racial amalga
mation and pardo mobility, Freyre
argued, “perhaps in no other coun
try is it possible to rise so quickly
from one social class to another.”
Mulatto women were an essential
element of the myth. A corner
stone of the ideology of racial
democracy was their attractiveness
to white males. Supposedly pos
sessing stronger libidos and weaker
racial prejudices than other
European men, Luso-Brazilian
males were said to idealize mulatas
as sexual partners. Even today,
popular books and movies rein
force these images, as does the
annual Carnaval jubilation, attract
ing hordes of sex-seeking tourists
from Europe and elsewhere.
Miscegenation—preferably
between white men and black
women— thus became the pre
scribed route to socioeconomic
ascent, condemning Afro-Brazilians
to a deceptively inclusive but
fiercely patriarchal, sexist and racist
doctrine.
Comparative scholars from
abroad embraced the mulatto
myth. Over decades, it was restat

ed and reformulated by, among
others, US sociologist Donald
Pierson, Swedish anthropologist
Magnus Morner, Dutch historian
Harmannus Hoetink and US
anthropologist Marvin Harris. In
their writings, it became the critical
factor for understanding differences
in race relations between Brazil and
the United States. Ironically, even
scholars who attacked the notion
of racial democracy supported the
myth. In the 1970s, US historian
Carl Degler published one of the
most celebrated comparative works
on Brazilian racial classification, in
which he argued that “the presence
of a separate place for the mulatto
in Brazil and its absence in the
United States define remarkably
well the heart of the difference.”
Degler maintained that Brazilian
pardos were engaged in a “flight
from blackness,” abandoning black
causes and ascending the socioeco
nomic hierarchy by bleaching their
family lines through procreation
with light-complexioned partners.
Little evidence was available to
support these assertions. Many
authors relied for proof on the very
architects of racial democracy. For
instance, in Negroes in Brazil—
which many later writers cited as a
classic— Pierson noted that his
chapter on pardos was “greatly

indebted” to Freyre s Sabrados e
Mucambas, one of the founding
works on racial democracy.
T
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In reality, aside from a handful of
exceptional cases, white Brazilians
made few real distinctions between
pardos and pretos during the
nation’s early history. It is true that
during the slave era pardos com
prised a large portion of the free
colored population, but freedom
was often tenuous for blacks. In
many cases, the law mandated sim
ilar restrictions for all people of
African descent—whether slave or
free. Whatever their skin tone, free
blacks were popularly referred to as
escravos form s, or free slaves.
The vast majority of pardos lived
humble lives. Judging from the
repeated complaints of observers
and officials, even those born to
wealthy slaveholders were routinely
abandoned by their white fathers.
Left to fend for themselves in a
harsh economic environment,
many subsisted through risky,
irregular and unrewarding toil or
resorted to begging and theft.
Perhaps because so many pardos
were forced to live outside the law,
slave-era reports regularly con
demned them in harsher terms
than pretos themselves. Pardos

The “mulatto myth” argued that Europeans,
Africans and indigenous peoples had blend
ed to form a nation perfectly suited to a
unique, tropical, European civilization.
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were often denounced as immoral,
lazy drunks who—unless
enslaved—contributed nothing to
society but a string of social ills.
Alternatively, they were depicted in
popular literature as presumptuous
and vain, involved in ridiculous
schemes to escape their cursed
black blood.
In contrast to their mythical
haughtiness, at least some pardos
identified with pretos and dedicat
ed themselves to black causes. Joao
Fernandes Vieira and Vicente
Ferreira de Paula are but two exam
ples of pardos who led black rebel
lions against white domination.
Among the free pardos who played
a prominent role in the struggle to
end slavery was Luis Gama, who
was sold into slavery by his white
father. Eventually securing his
freedom, Gama worked as a lawyer
for escaped slaves, preaching the
“right of insurrection.” Other par
dos active in the anti-slavery strug
gles included Jose do Patricfnio,
who has been called “the heart and
soul of the entire abolitionist cam
paign,” and Andre Rebou9 as,
whose earnings as one of Brazil’s
top engineers helped fund aboli
tionist publications and societies.
The abolition of slavery in 1888
proved a bitter disappointment,
even for the Afro-Brazilians who
had fought hardest to secure it.
W ith the fall of the Brazilian
monarchy the following year, the
former slave-owners secured their
hold on national policy making.
They displayed little regard for for
mer slaves, seeing them as inca
pable of an unchained existence.
From the 1890s through the
1920s, certain prominent Brazilian
intellectuals promoted “whitening”
as the solution to the nation’s per
ceived inferiority. They enthused
that Brazil was becoming steadily
whiter as the black population fell
victim to its own social discord,
Hemisphere Volume 9, Number 3

disease and low birth rates.
Through miscegenation, they
argued, blacks who reproduced
with lighter-skinned partners
allowed “stronger” white genes to
dominate in their mixed-race off
spring. In part to bolster the
whitening effort, Brazil’s leaders
actively recruited European immi
grants. Until the nationalistic
regime changes of the 1930s, white
immigrants routinely enjoyed hir
ing and pay advantages over blacks
with comparable skills. Whatever
tenuous positions some pardos had
enjoyed as free workers during the
slave era were sharply undermined
during this period.
Some pardos continued to fight
for black dignity after abolition.
Manoel Querino (1851-1923) was
the first Brazilian of any color to
undertake a serious study of AfroBrazilian history. He set out to
prove that blacks were essential
members of Brazilian society, not
only as laborers, but also as defend
ers and architects of national unity.
Other middle-class pardos estab
lished so-called “mulatto presses,”
producing periodicals whose chief
aim was to foster pan-black unity.
Employing all-encompassing terms
such as gen te de cor —people of
color— they protested white dis
crimination against blacks of all
colors.
Ta c k l in g
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More scholars have begun to
question the mulatto myth. As
more studies are completed, it is
increasingly obvious that Brazilians
who classify themselves as pardo
share much in economic terms
with those who prefer the label
preto. Studies by Brazilian and
foreign researchers, including
Nelson do Valle Silva, Carlos
Hasenbalg, George Reid Andrews
and Peggy Webster, suggest that, if
anything, pardos enjoy only mini

mal advantages over pretos. As a
group, blacks are considerably
worse off than whites.
In light of these findings, many
researchers have chosen to examine
Brazilian racial conditions along
white versus nonwhite lines.
Major Brazilian institutes, includ
ing the Instituto Brasileiro de
Geografia e Estadi'sticas (equivalent
to the US Census Bureau), have
also opted for bimodal classifica
tions when dealing with socioeco
nomic data on race. This trend
supports the efforts of many AfroBrazilian activist groups, such as
the Movimento Negro Unificado,
to redefine as negro “all those who
possess in the color of their skins,
in their faces or in their hair, fea
tures characteristic of that race.”
But the task of transforming
racial identity in Brazil will take
more than the statistical union of
pardos and pretos in textbooks and
government records. An important
first step is the deconstruction of
the myths that scholars have
helped create. Many academics in
the past perceived racial classifica
tions as the politically neutral
products of cultural, demographic
or historical circumstances. AfroBrazilian activists, by contrast, are
painfully aware that these defini
tions can be manipulated by the
powerful to reinforce their posi
tions of dominance. Equally
important is the realization that
racial identities can be embraced
by the subjugated to strengthen
their political positions. ■

Andrew J. de Groot Fernandes is a
Ph.D. candidate in the Flistory
D epartment at Tulane University.
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Coloring the Nation
by D avid Howard

Dominicans describe race with color-coded
terms ranging from coffee, chocolate, cin
namon and wheat to indio, nomenclature
which avoids using mulato or negro.

he Dominican
Republic holds an
important position in
today’s Caribbean.
Increasingly linked to
the United States via the transna
tional flow of people, capital and
culture, Dominican society faces
many challenges: adaptation to the
changing demands of external cul
resignified and reinvented to create
tural, economic and political rela
a sense of the past appropriate to
tions, and recognition of the inter
the social and political present.
nal tensions produced by a conflicThe majority of Dominicans
tive civil history and contested
could be described as mulato, but a
social identities.
variety of racial identities exist with
Dominican nationalism has often
in this broad category. As S. Torresbeen colored by a pervasive racism,
Saillant has argued, African
centered on a rejection of African
Dominicans do not see blackness as
ancestry and negritud. European
central to their racial awareness;
and indigenous heritages in the
other racial terms are employed
Dominican Republic have been cel
instead to describe racial identity.
ebrated at the expense of an African
Indio is by far the most common
past. In particular, the notion of
and adaptable. Flexible descriptions
dom inicanidad has been constructed
of color and phenotype allow famil
vis-a-vis Haiti, which shares the
ial and social variations of race to
island of Hispaniola with its
be incorporated in a society where a
Dominican neighbor. A racially
light racial aesthetic is paramount.
constructed fault-line has arisen
Despite the malleable nature of
from this territorial and historical
racial definition, however, everyday
association.
instances of prejudice and discrimi
The history and physical location
nation are evident and often overt.
of the Dominican Republic heavily
influence its citizens’ perception of
R a c e , R a c i s m a n d I d e n t it y
race. Three groups formed the
The term mulato itself demon
demographic basis for colonial soci
strates the subjectivity of race in the
ety in the Dominican Republic: the
Dominican Republic. Whereas
indigenous population, Spanish set
outsiders may view most
tlers and African slaves. By the
Dominicans as mulato, Dominicans
middle of the sixteenth century
themselves seldom use the term, for
only a minute fraction of the
it implies the negatively perceived
indigenous population remained,
image of African ancestry.
but the notion of lo indio has
Historically, Dominican elites
become an integral part of contem
have emphasized their strong
porary Dominican identity.
European heritage and ‘purity of
History has been renegotiated,
blood.’ They celebrated Spain, the

T

former colonial power, as la Madre
Patria, and cited Europe as the
source of Dominican culture and
civility. In the twentieth century,
this European bias was replaced in
many respects by a dependency on
the United States. To this day, a
light aesthetic remains fundamental
to any consideration of contempo
rary social relations.
Given the ambiguities involved in
the definition and ascription of
race, strict racial categories become
meaningless, confusing or blatantly
inaccurate, depending on the view
point of the observer or statistician.
The 1940 Dominican census
counted mulatos as 77% of the
population; negros, 1 2 %; and blancos, 11%. In 1960, census takers
were instructed to avoid registering
Dominicans as negro where feasi
ble. Less than a tenth of the popu
lation was classified as black.
More recently, researchers have cal
culated the Dominican population
as 65% mulato, 15% bianco and
15% negro, with the remaining 5 %
of the population belonging to
other ethnic groups, such as
Chinese or Lebanese.
These figures are fairly meaning
less. The continuum of skin color
and phenotype does not fall into
neat categories; what one person
considers mulato will be negro to
Hemisphere Volume 9, Number 3
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Acutely aware of his own nonelite ethnic and
social origins, Trujillo chose to deny his
country’s Haitian and African ancestry, even
resorting to lightening his own skin with
cosmetic powders.
another. Racial terms are highly
specific to person and place.
Dominicans describe race with
color-coded terms ranging from cof
fee, chocolate, cinnamon and wheat
to indio, nomenclature which
avoids using mulato or negro.
Indio is an ambiguous term, not
least because the entire indigenous
population of Hispaniola died or
was killed within 50 years of
Columbus’s arrival. Historically,
the term has been used to describe
brown skin color. It was not until
the dictatorship of Rafael Leonidas
Trujillo (1930 to 1961) that it was
popularized as an official descrip
tion of Dominican ethnicity. The
use of indio is another instance of
denial of African ancestry and rejec
tion of Haiti. It creates a racial cat
egory that cannot claim to be
white, but distances itself from
blackness.
Acutely aware of his own nonelite
ethnic and social origins, Trujillo
chose to deny his country’s Haitian
and African ancestry, even resorting
to lightening his own skin with cos
metic powders. Trujillo’s grandpar
ents were dark-skinned, but com
missioned biographies declared his
parentage to be ‘pure’ European and
traced his bloodlines to a Spanish
officer and a French marquis. The
massacre of 1937, during which the
Dominican military murdered over
12,000 dark-skinned Haitians and
Dominicans, was part of Trujillo’s
‘lightening’ project to distance the
Dominican nation from its Haitian
Hemisphere Volume 9, Number 3

neighbor and African heritage.
The bias toward lighter skin color
in the Dominican Republic is often
expressed in terms of aesthetics.
Racial descriptions frequently focus
on perceptions of ugliness and
beauty. Job advertisements that call
for employees of ‘good appearance,’
for example, may use a coded term
for race. Color prejudice is often
seen in Dominican banks, as well.
Until recently it was rare for the
public spaces of major banks to be
staffed by dark-skinned cashiers.
The aesthetics of racism were also
evident in a study of university stu
dents who were asked if they would
marry a darker-skinned partner.
Fifty-five percent replied that they
would not, expressing concern for
the ‘corruption’ of physical appear
ance through ‘race mixing.’
A range of terms used in everyday
speech avoid the implication of
African ancestry. Trigueno, rosadito,
destehido, rubio and cenizo respec
tively refer to skin color as wheatcolored, rosy, faded, blond/fair and
dark/ashen. These terms are regu
larly applied to the slightest varia
tion of color and tend to be wholly
inconsistent and variable in their
usage. The latter two, rubio and
cenizo, are located at opposite ends
of the color spectrum, but differen
tiation may be slight according to
the context of their usage.
H a it ia n s
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In contrast to this great variation
of color terminology, the attitude

toward Haitians, and especially
their presence in the Dominican
Republic, is often bluntly discrimi
natory. The number of Haitians
living in the Dominican Republic is
a highly contentious issue.
Estimates vary widely; some suggest
up to 1 . 5 million, but there are
probably around 500,000 Haitians
and Dominicans of recent Haitian
descent in Dominican territory.
The size of this population is said
to have doubled in the past 1 0 to
15 years. Particularly since the
1920s, Haitians have migrated to
work in the Dominican sugar
industry and have established rural
communities, often under condi
tions that have provoked concern
among international human rights
organizations. Many Haitians now
work in urban areas as retailers and
domestic workers or in the con
struction industry.
Significant numbers of Haitians
stay on in the Dominican Republic
after their seasonal contracts expire.
Their continuing residence in the
country, the indeterminate nation
ality of their offspring (who have
neither Dominican nor Haitian citi
zenship) and the scale of undocu
mented Haitian immigration are
emotive issues. Despite a history of
annual labor contracts between the
two countries, the Dominican mili
tary regularly deports Haitian work
ers, often without regard for their
legal status. Proposed changes to
the current migration law may
remove the longstanding right to
citizenship for those born in
Dominican territory, further mar
ginalizing the Haitian-Dominican
population. Even those who can
claim Dominican citizenship face
strict documentation requirements
or the threat of harassment.
Dominicans have traditionally
scorned work in the cane fields,
which is seen almost exclusively as
Haitian labor. The rural Haitian
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population is segregated physically
as a racial labor enclave, and socially
by racism and popular opposition
to assimilation. Dominicans recog
nize their need for Haitians as units
of labor, but condemn them to con
ditions of marginalization and infe
riority.
Is prejudice against Haiti func
tional to the Dominican state?
Haitian migrants provide low-cost,
essentially malleable labor. It could
be argued that wages are depressed
and conditions worsened for
Dominican workers, who then vili
fy the darker-skinned Haitian labor
ers. Even restrictions on immigra
tion and residency, imposed by the
Dominican government, deliberate
ly place Haitian labor in a vulnera
ble, servile position of illegality in
the context of widespread racial
prejudice.
Anti-Haitian sentiment extends
well beyond the workplace to com
mon derogatory slurs on the street
and in presidential campaign rheto
ric. Dominican electioneering dur
ing the 1990s was a hotbed of racist
politics. In the 1994 elections,
defamatory campaigns against darkskinned presidential candidate Jose
Francisco Pena Gomez concentrated
on his suspected Haitian parentage.
Videos broadcast on Dominican
television portrayed the late Pena
Gomez as hot-headed and irra
tional, shouting and arguing at
political meetings— connoting neg
ative stereotypes of Haitians as sav
age and uncivilized. The media
linked him closely with vodoun , and
one video showed him attending a
ceremony with a Brazilian faith
healer. Political opponents faxed
cartoons depicting the supposed
threat of Pena Gomez’s Haitian
ancestry to the Dominican people
to all numbers in Santo Domingo.
The potency of racism lies in its
embeddedness as a perceived natu
ral phenomenon. Dominicans

often excuse their anti-Haitian sen
timent as harmless, or refer to it as
‘common sense’ traditional rivalry.
Yet, although Haitians bear the
brunt of Dominican aggression,
dark-skinned Dominicans suffer
similar racist insults or are treated as
lower-status citizens, somatically
sidelined from authentic dom inicanidad.
Racist ideology portrays Haitians
and dark-skinned Dominicans as
victims of their own racial fate;
both are trapped by the color of
their skin and their genetic history.
Sympathy for the victim is muted
by the racist argument that Haitians
induce antipathy towards them
selves via allegedly innate cultural
practices, such as vodoun, which
are incompatible with Dominican
society. The concept of la raza
dom inicana unites Dominicans
against Haitians, but when per
ceived in terms of race, the same
idea relegates dark-skinned
Dominicans to the margins of an
imaginary racial heartland. La raza
inclusively combines race and
nation, and the prejudices of overt
and inferential racism.
M
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The Dominican Republic has
changed dramatically during the
last four decades, when the end of
the trujillato opened the island to
external cultural and economic
influences. The reality or hope of
international migration has become
part of many Dominicans’ lives.
The vast reach of international rela
tions, through migration, telecom
munications, travel, business links,
mass media and the arts, provides
an intense and frequent interchange
of economic and cultural experi
ences. Dominican migrants share
family, friends and business contacts
between two or more countries,
while maintaining strong social and
cultural links with their country of

origin. The perception and aware
ness of race, however, are among
the few aspects yet to be trans
formed by transnational develop
ments.
Dominicans living in the US face
different challenges of racial and
ethnic determination. Those born
outside the island relate less to
racialized concepts of dom inicanidad as they grow up in a society
that promotes more abrupt notions
of black, white or Hispanic. Even
the well-worn antagonism toward
Haiti confronts problems of legiti
macy on the streets of upper
Manhattan. Several writers have
suggested that the discrimination
experienced by Dominicans in New
York has the potential to change
perceptions of race in the
Dominican Republic. Yet, the very
success of the Dominican regenera
tive experience has to some extent
reproduced racial norms rather than
dispelled them. Dominicans born
in the United States, although less
attached to the traditional, highly
racialized concept of dominicanidad,
continue to use terms such as indio,
trigueno or rubio. In the 1990 cen
sus, only 26% of New York’s
Dominicans classified themselves as
black. Most listed themselves as
white or ‘other.’ US society at large
was not made privy to the ‘other’
category of indio.
Dominicans both in and outside
of the Dominican Republic are hav
ing to constantly readdress their
attitudes toward race. The chal
lenge of this adjustment will take
time to unfold. Meanwhile, the
impact of migratory experience on
la raza dom inicana remains uncer
tain. ■

D avid H oward is a lecturer in the
D epartment o f Geography at the
University o f Edinburgh.
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Ethnicity and Nationhood
by Ileana Schmidt-Diaz de Leon
ince the Mexican
Revolution, the Mexican
government has encouraged
an educational policy
designed to assimilate
Indians into national life.
Assimilation has implied the loss of
Indian identity as a condition of the
process of forging Mexican national
identity. For the last 20 years, how
ever, the Mexican educational sys
tem has offered specialized teaching
materials in Indian languages. These
materials include free textbooks cre
ated especially for Indian children by
Indian teachers, emphasizing indige
nous cultural values. The textbooks
are a new tool for Indian teachers to
promote ethnic identity within for
mal institutions, contributing an
added dimension to the struggle of
indigenous peoples to defend and
redefine their identity within the
Mexican national context. They
have empowered Indian teachers
and promoted the use of Indian lan
guages, changing the techniques
used for Indian education.
This study is based on an analyti
cal description of first- and secondgrade textbooks in the Nahuatl lan
guage, used in the Huasteca region
of Mexico (which includes portions
of the states of Veracruz,
Tamaulipas, San Luis Potosf,
Hidalgo and Queretaro) and the
northern highlands of Puebla. It
analyzes the discourse of texts and
images to identify elements that pro
mote ethnic and national identity
among Indian children. As an insti
tutional program, indigenous free
textbooks are an element of national
educational policy. The participa
tion of indigenous teachers in their
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Page from the 1549Mendoza Codex showing the different tasks taught to children by
gender. Boys are taught to carry loads, row and fish, while girls cook, weave and
sweep. In the upper panels, children are disciplined with such punishments as breath
ing the fum es o f burning chiles. The indigenous free textbooks reinforce gender roles
along with other traditional values.
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Mexico’s indigenous free textbooks
creation suggests that Indians in
Mexico are not simply engaged in a
process of acculturation. Using state
institutions to redefine ethnic identi
ty, Indians participate in the mestizo
world not only to be changed, but
also to continue being themselves.
M

e x ic o ’s

F ree T e x t b o o k s

At the heart of the curriculum in
Mexican schools are governmentissued textbooks, the use of which is
mandatory in all of the country’s
classrooms. Free textbooks have
been an element of state educational
policy since a special commission to
organize their production was creat
ed in 1959. The books’ content
reflected a new emphasis on national
unity, in contrast to the revolution’s
emphasis on class struggle. In the
context of education, national unity
meant cultural homogeneity as the
ultimate expression of mexicanidad.
Mexico could only become a nation
when every Mexican was united by a
set of common values and feelings.
The national free textbooks have
been reviewed and changed several
times. The most recent revision was
in 1992, when the curriculum was
reformed and special textbooks
introduced for regional history and
geography. Each state now has its
own history and geography text
books in addition to the national
surveys of these topics.
Mexico’s Indian communities have
always represented a challenge to
national educators. Modern educa
tional materials for teaching Indian
children to read and write trace back
at least to 1936, when cartillas de
alfabetizacion (literacy primers)
sought to teach Indian children

Spanish by first making them liter
ate in their own languages. In 1979,
the First National Seminar of
Bilingual-Bicultural Education in
Oaxtepec, Morelos produced the
idea of providing free textbooks to
Indian children. The seminar was
organized by the Alianza Nacional
de Profesionales Indfgenas Bilingiies
A.C. (ANPIBAC), members of
which went on to work at the newly
formed Direccion General de
Educacion Indfgena (DGEI) at the
Ministry of Public Education. The
DGEI was incorporated as a formal
branch of the ministry, replacing the
former Direccion General de
Educacion Extraescolar en el Medio
Indfgena. In contrast to its prede
cessor, the DGEI was not relegated
to extracurricular or “special” educa
tion; instead, Indian education was
legally recognized as an integral part
of the Mexican educational system.
Through the DGEI and the
Ministry of Public Education, the
Indian teachers of ANPIBAC nego
tiated and defined the goals, means
and orientation of formal Indian
education. The ministry issued the
first free textbooks for Indian chil
dren in 1980, and to date it has pro
duced editions in 56 different
indigenous languages. These text
books are part of a national program
and their general content is directed
by a common national objective;
however, they are not mere “transla
tions” or “copies” of the national
Spanish-language textbooks. In gen
eral, the indigenous free textbooks
focus on content related to Indian
cultures, whereas the national text
books focus on mestizo national
ideals.

In d ig e n o u s F r ee T e x t b o o k s
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Mexico’s indigenous free textbooks
are saturated with cultural values.
They express the way of life, beliefs
and customs of Mexico’s indigenous
groups. Many of these values are
expressed in the way men, women
and children are depicted conduct
ing their daily life and work.
Through these activities, indigenous
people preserve and redefine their
ethnic identity in terms of their rela
tionships within the community and
with the national society. Each gen
der and age group is shown per
forming specific tasks appropriate to
Indian cultural values.
In the Indian free textbooks, these
values include family, community,
collective work, land, corn and
knowledge. The extended family is
the preferred kinship structure, and
membership in it is emblematic of
belonging to the wider social group.
Individual life is subjected to social
life and family maintenance; the fail
ure of an individual to carry out his
or her responsibilities affects the
entire family nucleus.
In the books, the family and the
home are strongly linked. The man
is the provider and the woman is the
housekeeper. Among children, too,
many activities are distributed by
gender, typically according to the
physical space in which the children
carry them out. Usually, boys per
form their tasks outside the home,
while girls perform them inside,
although the activities may in fact be
the same. The family’s equilibrium
appears to reside in the relationship
between it and the home. The indi
vidual, the family and the home are
Hemisphere Volume 9, Number 3
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integrated elements of nature, and
nature is an integrated element of
life. Each family member has a
responsibility to fulfill in order to
maintain this equilibrium.
The Nahuatl textbooks present
the family as a patriarchal structure
in which the man has clearly defined
social functions. Women’s functions
are sometimes ambiguous; at times
women are portrayed as advisors to
their children, but this capacity is
often obscured by the grandfather’s
role as the main transmitter of cul
tural values. He ensures that family
members carry out their responsibil
ities and maintain the people’s cus
toms. The grandfather is responsi
ble for transmitting tradition and
history, whereas the mother teaches
children how to behave and perform
certain tasks. The mother advises
only her own children, while the
grandfather teaches all children in
the community.
Thus, the grandfather guides the
performance of tradition, the moth
er runs the household and the father
provides food. Women give life,
and men work to maintain and pre
serve it in a certain way. These roles
are presented in the context of an
overall image of the Indian as a
poor, hard-working peasant, a pro
ducer and consumer of maize who
from childhood on is responsible for
the family’s sustenance.
The poor Indian is a constant in
the textbooks, in which the routine
of daily activities is presented as nec
essary for survival. In this context,
any change in women’s roles could
jeopardize the family and the larger
community. The main value the
textbooks teach is that the family is
the nucleus of community and the
central element in defining ethnicity.
Questioning this order implies a
threat to the organization of survival
and Indian identity itself.
The family may be the center of
survival, but it cannot exist outside
Hemisphere Volume 9, Number 3

the community. The two are linked
through specific ways of life, lan
guage, land and commerce. The
family’s relationship to the commu
nity is like the individual’s relation
ship to the family; neither can be
conceived of as separate from the
other. Ethnic identity is transmitted
to the community through rites, cer
emonies and the fulfillment of cul
tural values supported by the family.
Land links families and is an ele
ment of spatial and cultural belong
ing. Images in the textbooks of men
sowing the land in the traditional
manner imply possession of the
knowledge needed to cultivate and
harvest food, including mastering
the agricultural calendar, tools, ritu
als and the organization of labor.
Corn itself is the staple source of
nourishment for Indian peoples, and
is linked to identity through its pro
duction and transformation as food.
In the Nahuatl textbooks, corn pro
duction is associated with male
labor, whereas corn transformation is
associated with female work. Maize
is presented as the legacy of the
ancestors and Centeotl, the god of
corn. It is an element of tradition
and the life cycle, providing suste
nance and the reason to work.
Moreover, working the family’s
milpa, or corn plot, requires the par
ticipation of several people. Corn
thus brings individuals together in
the collective responsibility to work
for the survival of family and com
munity.
Work helps define relationships
among family members and between
them and the community. Women
relate to the family primarily
through food processing and prepa
ration, while men relate to the com
munity through collective work and
rituals. In turn, all community
members are linked to each other
through a common history originat
ing in Aztec times. The textbooks
express these values as traditional

knowledge that is both a product of
experience and a legacy passed on
from generation to generation.
The textbooks present two kinds
of knowledge: traditional knowledge
and school knowledge. The elders
are the source of the former and
teachers of the latter. Teachers are
portrayed as organizers and guides,
with the peculiarity of being able to
fail at the performance of tradition.
Older men are presented as sages
because they have traditional knowl
edge and speak the native language.
Reading and writing are related only
to school; these are the school
teacher’s tasks and knowledge.
When the school is involved in
the relation between the individual
and the community, gender- and
age-based activities are modified by
values ascribed only to the school.
This is the only place where women
are shown performing nontraditional activities, characterized as being
performed outside the home, that
include teaching children to read
and write. The school is a kind of
neutral ground where boys and girls
acquire the universal student ethos.
School plays a dual role in cultural
change and continuity. On the one
hand, it gives Indian children oppor
tunities that their parents did not
have before. On the other hand, it
teaches Indian language, history, cul
tural values and traditions. School
also plays a role in adult gender
dynamics, representing a space
where men and women can change
their relationship with the commu
nity and their social role within it.
A woman may make tortillas at
home, but she can also teach the
alphabet at school.
T h e I n d ig e n o u s F ree T e x t b o o k
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The Mexican free textbook is an
agent of socialization. Its contents
are intended to become part of a
student’s values and beliefs. Topics
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included in the textbooks are set by
the Ministry of Public Education
and involve not only educational
goals, but also the orientation of
national educational policy. Because
the main interest of Mexican educa
tional policy is the promotion of
nationality via the education of all
citizens, learning the values included
in the free textbooks is necessary for
maintaining the national society.
The indigenous free textbooks,
therefore, are official educational
tools for promoting both nationality
and Indianness.
The Nahuatl free textbooks pres
ent three levels of identity: Indian,
Nahuatl and Mexican. Being Indian
means being poor, rural, a producer
and consumer of corn, technologi
cally unsophisticated, a hard worker
responsible for the family’s survival,
a preserver of ethnic identity, and a
possessor of values that should be
preserved. Nahuatl identity is con
veyed primarily through language,
community and regional origin.
National identity is represented by
national symbols and the Mexican
Constitution.
One way in which national identi
ty is related to Nahuatl identity is
through Mexico’s national symbols,
many of which originate in the
Aztec past. The symbols represent
the history of the Nahuatl people
transformed into national mytholo
gy. For example, the Mexican flag,
which shows an eagle standing on a
cactus and devouring a serpent, bor
rows an image from Aztec history.
Citizenship is therefore not an
assigned condition, but belongs to
the Nahuatl people for historic rea
sons. The sense one gets from the
textbooks is that being Mexican does
not mean living according to the
values of the national society; rather,
it is a state acquired naturally by
virtue of history.
From a Nahuatl point of view,
therefore, Mexican national symbols

are not necessarily associated with
schools or other state institutions.
Schools in the Nahuatl textbooks are
associated more with the process of
learning to read and write than with
a sense of nationhood. Although
the official role of the Indian schools
is to promote national identity, in
practice they serve as a formal means
of ethnic redefinition. The indige
nous free textbooks do not deny
national identity; rather, they pro
mote respect for law and portray the
state as an abstract authority from
which Indians receive protection.
The books give a sense of Indians
attempting not only to be tolerated
by non-Indians, but also to have
their differences recognized and
accepted.
B e l o n g in g
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Can Indians be part of the nation
while maintaining their unique cul
tures and ethnic identities? The
experience of the indigenous free
textbooks suggests that Indians can
work within the state’s institutions
to influence indigenista policy-mak
ing; that is, they can live according
to the rules of the mestizo while
protecting Indian culture. Indian
teachers have accomplished this
duality by using institutionalized
educational material that promotes
Indian identity and culture in
Indian languages.
The existence of free textbooks for
Indian children in their own lan
guages has a special meaning. It
implies conscious action by Indian
teachers and communities to direct
the formal education of Indian
youth. Indian teachers have gained
an arena in formal education to pro
mote their cultural objectives. Their
role is protected by the acceptance
of Indian languages as legitimate
routes of learning. The textbooks
are an example of Indian participa
tion in institutions that directly
pressure Indian cultures.

The presence of individuals with a
recognized ethnic identity in nation
al institutions does not necessarily
mean a loss of identity; rather, it can
be a strategy to achieve protection
and benefits from the state. Indians
in Mexico are struggling within the
boundaries of the state to influence
political decisions that affect their
sense of identity. The indigenous
free textbooks offer a world view in
which the principal desire is to con
tinue being Indian. The books
teach children to preserve a way of
life without questioning the status
quo of either Indian or national
society; even rural poverty is justified
as a condition for preserving Indian
culture. Nevertheless, the books
themselves have made Indians par
ticipants in the national educational
program. Indian teachers have
defined the content of the textbooks
based on their own cultural values,
making the books a forum for
Indians to manifest their inclusion
within the Mexican nation.
The indigenous free textbooks also
empower Indians to be literate in
their own languages. Indians now
have not only a written language,
but also the means to learn it in an
institutionalized framework. This
situation benefits Indians as well as
the state: The former gain a politi
cal forum from which they cannot
be excluded, and the latter is legit
imized by including Indians in its
development programs.
Indians want to be recognized and
respected for their cultural differ
ences while participating actively in
the modern state. In other words,
they seek recognition as members of
the nation and actors in the national
program. After all, Mexico was
founded on the land of their ances
tors. ■

Ileana Schmidt-Dlaz de Leon is a doc
toral candidate in the Latin American
Studies program at Tulane University.
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Our Land
by Andre Legare
n April 1, 1999, the
Canadian govern
ment officially pro
claimed the Nunavut
Territory and govern
ment. Nunavut, an Inuktitut word
which means “our land,” was carved
out of the Northwest Territories to
become the most recent member of
the Canadian federation. It is also
Canadas largest political unit, cover
ing one-fifth of the country’s land
mass (2.1 million square km). This
vast geographic area is inhabited by
only 25,000 people, more than 80%
of whom are Inuit.
The Nunavut territorial govern
ment enjoys the same political pow
ers as other territorial governments
in Canada. These powers and juris
dictions are similar to those held by
Canadian provinces, except that the
Canadian federal government owns
and manages public crown lands in
Nunavut, the Yukon and North
west Territories. Like the other terri
tories, Nunavut is a non-ethnic pub
lic jurisdiction; however, since Inuit
comprise the majority population,
Nunavut has become a de facto
Inuit government.
Backgroun d

The idea of creating a new politi
cal jurisdiction in Canada’s north
stemmed from a proposal submitted
by Inuit Tapirisat of Canada (a panCanadian Inuit organization) to the
federal government in February
1976. The Nunavut Proposal was
put forth as part of federal policy on
native comprehensive land claims.
The basic idea of the proposal was
to create a territory with a majority
Inuit population to better reflect
Hemisphere Volume 9, Number 3

Coat o f arms o f Nunavut. The caribou and narwahl represent the land and sea
animals that are pa rt o f Nunavut’s rich natural heritage an d provide sustenance
to its people. The motto in Inuktitut reads, Nunavut, our strength.
Inuit values and perspectives than
was the case in the Northwest
Territories.
After 15 years of arduous negotia
tions between the Canadian govern
ment, the Northwest Territories and
Tungavik Federation of Nunavut (an
umbrella group of organizations rep
resenting the interests of the Inuit of

the central and eastern Canadian
Arctic), a final land claims agree
ment was approved by the federal
government in June 1993. This
agreement recognized the need to
establish a new territorial govern
ment in the central and eastern
Canadian Arctic, a goal realized in
1999.
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The challenges of an Inuit government in Nunavut
For the Canadian government, the
reasons for establishing the new ter
ritory were largely political. The
measure attracted favorable media
coverage and represented an oppor
tunity to improve Canada’s standing
in the international community. It
was also an effective means of rein
forcing Canadian sovereignty over
the waters of the Arctic archipelago,
an issue the United States has been
reluctant to recognize.
The Nunavut Territory gives the
Inuit control over 353,610 square
km, with mineral rights in a 36,257
square km area. Co-management
agencies, equally composed of Inuit
and federal government representa
tives, manage land resources.
Federal funds in the amount of 1.15
billion Canadian dollars will be dis
bursed in Nunavut over a 14-year
period, and the Inuit are entitled to
a percentage of royalties from
resource development projects.
P o l it ic a l Q

u e st io n s

Despite these gains, however,
political administration of the
Nunavut Territory faces important
challenges. Six areas seem likely to
have an impact on Nunavut’s politi
cal future: (1) Inuit employment
and the Nunavut public sector; (2)
language policy; (3) the territory’s
finances; (4) traditional knowledge
and Nunavut government policies;
(5 ) coexistence between co-management agencies and government insti
tutions; and (6 ) the inherent Inuit
right to self-government.
Among the most pressing of these
problems is Inuit representation in
public sector employment. For
Nunavut residents, the vast majority

Economic reliance on the federal govern
ment, low education rates and linguistic
assimilation are among the challenges facing
the Nunavut Territory.
of whom are Inuit, to evolve a posi
tive feeling of identity with Nunavut
political institutions, it would be
important for Inuit not only to con
trol the legislative assembly (15 of
the 19 members are Inuit), but also
public sector administration. To
reach this crucial goal it is imperative
to have a representative proportion
of Inuit civil servants (i.e., approxi
mately 80% of public employees) in
the territorial government.
The Nunavut Implementation
Commission has predicted that the
territory’s public sector will employ
1200 people by January 1, 2002.
Before Nunavut was established, 550
civil servants in the Northwest
Territories administration lived in
the Nunavut region. About half of
these employees (300) were Inuit.
They generally filled subordinate
positions, and all were transferred to
the new Nunavut government.
With only 300 Inuit currently in the
Nunavut public sector, is it realistic
to believe that the goal of 1000 Inuit
civil servants will be met in the next
two years? This question is even
more acute when one considers that
less than 200 Inuit in Nunavut have
completed a high school education
and only 1 0 have a university degree
(one of them is the Premier of
Nunavut, Paul Okalik). In view of
the lack of training of Inuit job can

didates, those who are hired will
most likely continue to occupy sub
ordinate positions within Nunavut’s
administration.
A second essential challenge facing
the new territory is language policy.
Today, about 85% of the Inuit pop
ulation in Nunavut speaks Inuktitut.
However, the risk of linguistic assim
ilation in favor of the English lan
guage remains high, particularly
among the younger Inuit generation.
Already, close to half of Inuit under
the age of 15 cannot speak Inuktitut.
In its role as protector of Inuit cul
ture and language, the territorial
government must enact a language
policy aimed at safeguarding and
promoting the Inuit language in
Nunavut.
A third concern facing Nunavut’s
political leaders is financial.
Nunavut’s weak tax base, the fact
that its natural resources are mostly
owned by the federal government,
and the territory’s remoteness from
southern markets make it almost
entirely dependent on federal funds.
The annual budget of the Nunavut
government was fixed at 640 million
Canadian dollars, (fiscal year
2 0 0 0 /2 0 0 1 ), of which $580 million
will be provided by Ottawa. This
economic reliance on the federal
government may limit Nunavut’s
political autonomy.
Hemisphere Volume 9, Number 3
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Fourth, Nunavut’s government
faces the challenge of incorporating
Inuit traditional knowledge into the
territory’s administration. The Inuit
people have roots firmly anchored in
the Arctic landscape and a world
view that encompasses particular
relationships with the natural and
spirit worlds. Most Inuit, and in
particular the community’s elders,
believe that government laws, insti
tutions and programs should reflect
Inuit traditional knowledge. They
want to see Nunavut government
policies incorporate some Inuit val
ues and customs into the decision
Hemisphere Volume 9, Number 3

making process. Among Nunavut’s
1 0 government ministries, however,
the Department of Culture, Elders
and Youth, which is responsible for
the implementation of a traditional
knowledge policy, was allocated the
lowest annual budget ($4 million).
Under these circumstances, can
Nunavut’s legislators be expected to
formulate and enact an Inuit tradi
tional knowledge policy?
The implementation of the
Nunavut Land Claims Agreement
created five co-management agen
cies, leading to another area of con
flict in Nunavut. The co-manage

ment agencies, equally composed of
native and non-native representa
tives, have a mandate to protect the
environment and manage the devel
opment of natural resources within
the Nunavut settlement area. These
responsibilities overlap with those of
the Nunavut Department of
Sustainable Development. To avoid
potential conflict, it will be impor
tant to implement close cooperation
between the co-management agen
cies and this government depart
ment.
Finally, unresolved issues remain
with regard to the Inuit right to self-
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government. For Ottawa, the estab
lishment of the Nunavut Territory
answers the traditional demands of
Inuit leaders. The federal govern
ment argues that the Inuit of
Nunavut, through their majority
ratio, enjoy de facto self-govern
ment. By this logic, there is no
need for official legislation regarding
Inuit self-government since, for all
practical purposes, this goal has
already been attained. In addition,
as we have seen, Ottawa has com
mitted a considerable amount of
money to create the new territory
and contributes largely to its yearly
budget. The federal government is
not interested in investing additional
sums of money to create some sort
of as yet undefined Inuit self-government in Nunavut.
For Inuit leaders, however, the
establishment of Nunavut has noth
ing to do with Inuit self-govern
ment. Without defining precisely
what shape Inuit self-government
would take in the context of
Nunavut, Inuit are adamant on the
fact that one must distinguish
between a non-ethnic public govern
ment such as the one presently
administering the territory and a
system of Inuit self-government
based on ethnicity, in which only
Inuit could vote and be represented.
For now, the Inuit feel confident
that, because of their demographic
majority, they will control Nunavut’s
economic, social and political agen
da. However, what would happen if
in the future Inuit were to become a
minority within Nunavut?
A M

odel for
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Nunavut’s legislators must come
to terms with these and other issues
in the months and years ahead.
Nunavut has marked nearly two
years of existence, but the questions
raised here remain unanswered.
Nunavut will not be a panacea for
the socioeconomic malaise affecting

today’s Inuit society; at best, the
new territorial government will
allow Inuit to take into their own
hands their social, economic and
political destinies, enabling them to
better stand up to tomorrow’s chal
lenges.
The establishment of the Nunavut
Territory gives the Inuit of the cen
tral and eastern Canadian Arctic a
unique opportunity to create poli
cies and institutions based on Inuit
traditions and customs. The territo
ry also gives the Inuit a greater voice
within the broader Canadian agen
da, especially in cases in which
Canada is involved in negotiating
international conventions that
might affect Inuit interests. For
example, Canada would be hard
pressed to negotiate any internation

al accord that could affect Inuit har
vesting rights in the Arctic without
prior consultations with the
Nunavut government.
Finally, the regional political
autonomy enjoyed by the citizens of
Nunavut could inspire other Inuit
groups to seek similar political pow
ers. Like today’s Greenland,
Nunavut could come to symbolize a
form of Inuit government arrange
ment within nation-states that may
serve as a political model for other
Inuit groups in Russia and in
Alaska, as well as minority ethnic
groups in other countries.

Andre Legare is completing his Ph.D.
in the Department o f Geography at
Queen’s University in Kingston,
Ontario.
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Northern Jurisdiction
by Ailsa Henderson
he Nunavut Act and
Nunavut Land Claims
Agreement of 1993
was the largest land
claim settlement in
Canadian history. Along with the
Nunavut Political Accord, it marked
the beginning of the development
of Canadas third territory,
Nunavut, officially established in
April 1999. These events are
remarkable not only for the quanti
ties of land they involve and the
flexibility they allow within the
political organization of the
Canadian federation, but also for
the lessons they provide for other
culturally distinct regions seeking to
obtain greater political autonomy.
The creation of new institutions
allows for attempts to correct the
biases and unpopular practices of
former structures and rebuild the
often negative relationship between
citizens and the state. The
approach toward political develop
ment in Nunavut is an example of
how one federation has attempted
to adapt to the diverse cultural pop
ulations within its borders.
The Nunavut Territory does not
offer aboriginal self-government in
strict terms, but to many observers,
it adds up to de facto self-determi
nation for the Inuit population.
The Land Claim Agreement and
the Political Accord, and the institu
tions established to ensure their
implementation, must come to
terms with the particular demands
of political life in a northern, geo
graphically extended region. They
An inukshuk adorns Nunavut’s landscape. These stone cairns, in the form o f a
must also take into account Inuit
human being, are built by the Inuit as landmarks on a treeless landscape. Photo:
cultural demands, which may con
Andre Legare.
flict with the interests of other resi-
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Government structures in Nunavut

*

The fla g o f Nunavut feautures the inukshuk and the North Star.
dents of Nunavut. The resulting
tensions will dictate much of the
future success of the territorial gov
ernment and of Nunavut itself.
A s s ig n in g J u r is d ic t io n

Situated in the eastern portion of
Canada’s north, Nunavut represents
approximately 20% of Canada’s
land mass and 60% of the former
Northwest Territories. It contains
two-thirds of Canada’s coastline and
four time zones (although only
three are used). These vast reaches
are home to less than 30,000 inhab
itants, more than 80% of whom are
Inuit. The territory is defined by
three regions—Qikiqtaaluk-Baffin
(east and north), Kivalliq-Keewatin
(south and central, near Hudson
Bay) and Kitikmeot (central and
western)—which in turn contain 28
communities. The largest of these
is the capital, Iqaluit, with a popula
tion of 4,500. Due to the large

proportion of Inuit inhabitants,
Inuktitut is one of the official lan
guages of the new territory, along
with English and French.
According to the 1996 Canadian
census, the rate of population
growth in Nunavut far outstrips
that of the Northwest Territories
and the rest of Canada. At the
same time, education levels are sig
nificantly lower. Well over half the
Nunavut population is under 25
and lacks a high school diploma.
High levels of unemployment and
demand for services for younger
people were a persistent obstacle to
development in the Yellowknifecentered Northwest Territories.
Such demographic demands, in
addition to the geographic expanse
of the region and the cultural par
ticularity of the Inuit, dictated
many of the provisions of the
Nunavut Land Claim Agreement,
which covers Inuit title to land, and

the Nunavut Act, which establishes
the structure of government in the
new territory.
The structure of the Nunavut
government does not differ signifi
cantly from that of the Yukon and
Northwest Territories, and constitu
tionally the division of power is
similar. This resemblance is not
surprising, given that the Nunavut
Act was modeled on the Northwest
Territories Act. Despite the resem
blance, however, Nunavut, by virtue
of its origins as a land claims settle
ment, occupies a unique place in
the Canadian federation. Through
the Land Claims Agreement,
Nunavut gained decision-making
capacity in areas of jurisdiction nor
mally reserved for the federal gov
ernment.
Ottawa began to heed demands
for self determination and develop
strategies for dealing with the vast
distances within the Northwest
Territories in the 1970s. Efforts to
address the issues of aboriginal land
titles and cultural and linguistic
protection for the Inuit sparked an
interest in resolving the land dis
putes in the area. The Nunavut
Land Claims Agreement was the
product of decades of negotiations.
Among other provisions, it recog
nized Inuit title to approximately
350,000 square km of land and ear
marked close to US$1.5 billion in
federal money for the area over a
period of 14 years. It also granted
the Inuit royalties from oil, gas and
mineral development on Crown
land, hunting and fishing rights,
and a role in environmental protec
tion. The deal acknowledged the
goal of greater participation of Inuit
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Nunavut parliam ent building, Iqaluit. Photo: Andre Legare.
firms in the Nunavut economy and
the need for training and education
of Inuit peoples, as well as hiring
practices that would reflect the
majority Inuit proportion of the
population. In exchange, the Inuit
signed away future claims to rights
and title on the land.
The Land Claims Agreement,
which contains limited provisions
for the future political development
of the territory, was created in con
junction with the Nunavut Act, a
political accord which governs all
individuals within the boundaries of
Nunavut, not just the Inuit. In
addition to the goal of proportional
representation within the civil serv
ice, the Nunavut Act included rep
resentation for the Inuit, territorial
and federal governments in institu
tions dealing with federal jurisdic
tion in the territories.
The legislation further provided
for the creation of two bodies, the
Nunavut Implementation
Commission (NIC) and a remod
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eled Nunavut Tunngavik
Incorporated (NTI). Granted the
power to make by-laws and tem
porarily in charge of the Nunavut
Consolidated Revenue Fund, the
NIC eased the transition phase
between the political agreement and
the first elected government. The
NTI has a slightly different mission;
a private corporation designed to
ensure that the land claims agree
ment is carried out in a manner that
best represents the interests of the
Inuit, it attempts to protect com
munity principles of self-reliance
and cultural and social well-being.
The distinction between the NIC
and NTI is between a public body
and an ethnic one, mirroring the
distinction between the political
accord and the land claims agree
ment.
P o l it ic a l P r o v is io n s

Under the Nunavut Act, the terri
tory maintains control over matters
that relate to the working of the leg

islature, the licensing and importing
of intoxicants, local and municipal
matters, direct taxation, language,
hospitals, land, property and agri
culture, and justice (both civil and
criminal), including courts and pris
ons. The territory is not permitted
to restrict the rights of First Nations
peoples or Inuit with respect to
hunting or trapping. Nothing with
in the act is to be interpreted as
granting the legislature greater pow
ers than those provided in the
Canadian Constitution.
By virtue of its role as a territory
and former shared jurisdiction with
the Northwest Territories, Nunavut
displays a considerable overlap of
institutions. Some bodies, such as
the Water Management Board, con
tain members from both territories.
In other cases, membership is
shared among three different territo
ries. For example, members of the
Supreme Court of the Yukon and
Northwest Territories are automati
cally members of the Nunavut
Supreme Court. There is also a
degree of overlap with the Canadian
government. The Auditor General
of Canada, for example, is also the
Auditor General of Nunavut. But it
is the way in which the areas of
jurisdiction and limitations have
been interpreted in Nunavut that
stands as a testament to the NIC’s
efforts to respond to the cultural
and geographic demands of the ter
ritory. A new, “single-level trial
court system” will affect the admin
istration and dispensing of justice in
the territory. The government also
boasts streamlined structures that
eliminate the regional councils of
education and Board of Health.
These structural influences co
exist within the broader political
culture of the north. The current
Nunavut legislature, and its previ
ous incarnation as the Northwest
Territories legislature, are the only
assemblies without political parties.
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Candidates run as independents, a
fact with significant ramifications
not only for cost and ease of cam
paigning, but also for the degree of
consensus exercised in the daily
working culture of the assembly.
During the campaign, one of the
candidates for premier, Goo
Arlooktoo, complained that the lack
of political parties made it difficult
to distinguish political preferences
among candidates. According to
the Northwest Territories govern
ment, the consensus form of gov
ernment is closer to traditional abo
riginal ways of arriving at decisions.
It was in this institutional and cul
tural context that Nunavut voters
elected their new government.
Residents of Nunavut have been
to the polls frequently in the last 1 0
years. Voting has decided three
plebiscites on the Land Claims
Agreement, the offer of twinned
constituencies to ensure gender par
ity, and the location of the territo
ry’s capital. Elections in February
1999 selected the 19 members of
the Nunavut Legislative Assembly.
Voter turnout was 8 8 %, and the
choice was between 71 candidates,
1 1 of whom were women. The
redrawing of electoral boundaries in
the neighboring Northwest
Territories, a formal apology for
past injustices from the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police, and
plans to ensure a continued market
for the seal hunt were among the
political issues raised during the
campaign. Following the election,
the members of the legislative
assembly (18 men and one woman)
elected Paul Okalik as premier.
The new government has 1 0
departments that address issues
ranging from sustainable develop
ment to culture, language, elders
and youth. Seven men, including
the premier, share the burden of
these portfolios. In an effort to
adapt to the needs of a vast and

diverse territory, departments and
agencies of the government will be
established throughout Nunavut in
addition to occupying offices in
Iqaluit. In accordance with the
principles of the Nunavut Land
Claims Agreement, NTI, Arctic
College, the Department of Indian
Affairs and the government of the
Northwest Territories have all been
involved in training personnel for
the demands of government and
business in the new territory.
C h allen ges A

head

In its first report, entitled
Footprints in New Snow , the NIC
highlighted some of the issues fac
ing the people of Nunavut. While
reiterating the goals that the new
government and its civil service be
representative and cost efficient
while maintaining the territory’s
cultural distinctiveness, the report
noted that popular expectations—
whether unrealistically high or
low—could damage the ability of
the new legislature to perform effec
tively.
Many key issues involve the geo
graphic and cultural particularity of
the new territory. Voters and candi
dates in the 1999 elections identi
fied the high unemployment rate,
economic regeneration and oppor
tunities for youth as particular areas
of concern. Poor housing and serv
ice infrastructure, a cost of living
one and a half times higher than in
Canada’s southern provinces, and
high levels of suicide and substance
abuse are also worthy of special
attention. At the local level, com
plaints about poor sidewalks and lit
ter in Iqaluit co-exist with concern
over the centralization of power in
Rankin Inlet and the capital. Other
issues presented themselves after the
election. New commissioner Helen
Maksagak, for example, pledged in
her throne speech to make Nunavut
a single time zone.

Among the major areas of con
cern, and one highlighted consis
tently by the NTI, is protection of
the cornerstones of Inuit identity:
culture and language. Recent data
from Statistics Canada show that
almost half of the population has
engaged in what are broadly defined
as traditional activities, but that
most of this involvement is limited
to hunting. Twenty-three percent
report some participation in tradi
tional crafts, and only 7 .6 % in trap
ping. In addition, one-quarter of
Nunavut’s population speaks
English at home. In an effort to
strengthen the indigenous lan
guage’s place in society, the legisla
tive assembly voted to conduct
much of the government’s work in
Inuktitut.
Self-determination and political
autonomy are powerful goals and
popular phrases. Asymmetrical fed
erations such as Spain and recent
constitutional developments in
Great Britain highlight the efforts
being made in many parts of the
world to ensure that political insti
tutions are responsive to the popu
lations closest to them. These
examples not only suggest that the
goal of political renewal is a popular
one, but that culturally or ethnically
distinct populations are able to gain
greater control over their political
destinies than regions lacking mark
ers of distinction. By attempting to
create political institutions more
responsive to the needs of its Inuit
residents, the government of
Nunavut must balance the cultural
needs of the majority while meeting
the political needs of all residents.
The ability to navigate this dual
mandate will determine much of
the future success of Nunavut. ■

Ailsa Henderson is a lecturer in the
Department o f Politics an d Centre o f
Canadian Studies at the University o f
Edinburgh.
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Image and Vision
by Sarah Corona Berkin
an Miguel Huaixtita is a
mountain village in the
Sierra Madre Occidental,
in the northern part of the
Mexican state of Jalisco.
It has a population of approximate
ly 710 Huichol Indians. The vil
lage has no electricity, advertising,
billboards, newspapers or even fulllength mirrors. Inside and out, the
walls of the houses are usually left
blank; ordinary decorations, such
as calendars and photographs, are
rare. The same is true of the vil
lage’s schools and kaliguey, or holy
places, which are unadorned by
images. The only Western images
San Miguel Huaixtita’s residents see
are the illustrations in children’s
school books, photographs brought
by the occasional visitor, or the
labels on the few packaged goods
for sale in the village store.
What happens to the act of see
ing in a community where there
are no images? Do people look at
each other differently? W hat is the
relationship between the a-iconic
glance and the universe that sur
rounds the Huichol?
These were some of the ques
tions I hoped to answer in San
Miguel Huaixtita. The following
photos are the product of a
research project undertaken at the
Tatusi Maxakwaxi (Our
Grandfather Deer Tail) secondary
school. The school’s 100 students
were each given a disposable cam
era with enough film to take 27
pictures. They were briefly
instructed in the use of the camera,
including such tips as the impor
tance of keeping the lens clean and
not pointing directly at the sun.
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After one week, the film was devel
oped and returned to the students.
Some participated in one-on-one
interviews in which they were
asked to classify and comment on a
selection of photographs. Their
responses, along with observations
made during the author’s extended
stay in the community, yield some
clues about how the Huichol of
San Miguel Huaixtita view each
other and the world.
As a form of communication,
images reflect trends in contempo
rary society. We live in the era of
the close-up, a point of view that
privileges the human face. In
Western culture, the face has
become the locus of all drama.
This emphasis has produced a cer
tain stereotyping of emotional
expression, a sentimentalism and
an aesthetic in which images
manipulate our moods. In con
trast, the Huichol photographs are
rarely close-ups. They contain a
wealth of minute and varied detail.
Their austere poses and panoramic
views allow us to see complete
worlds instead of being made to
feel subjective impressions.
Another way in which the
Huichol photographs differ from
Western images is in the use they
make of the horizon. Western cul
ture has compressed its line of
vision, influenced largely by the
optical illusions and images broad
cast on television. Does this new
perspective— up close, without a
horizon or depth of field—imply
an impoverishment of our vision?
Feliciano, a Huichol teacher,
offered this opinion: “The Huichol
have eagle eyes__Eagles are clever

and shrewd; they see everything in
panorama.”
Unlike Western amateur photog
raphers, the Huichol photogra
phers do not generally use people
or objects as their central vantage
points. Instead, the camera is
adjusted so that people or animals
are integrated into the landscape.
They may appear to the left or to
the right of the center so as not to
obscure a house, mountain or
stone that forms part of the back
drop. Just as in oral communica
tion, signs are not separated from
their origins. Whereas written and
electronic forms of communication
send us spinning across space and
time, the Huichol photographs
represent an instance in which the
body and the voice— or in this
case, the body and the eye—come
together to produce a harmonious
whole.
The discovery of a symbolic rela
tionship between indigenous peo
ples and the land should come as
no surprise. For centuries, land
and the question of its ownership
have been the most important fac
tors in the survival of indigenous
communities. Conflicts over land
have produced violent clashes
between Indians, Europeans and
mestizos. The disputes have their
root in differing concepts of the
relationship between nature and
culture. For Westerners, nature
and culture are separate and exist
in opposition to each other; for the
Huichol, the two depend on one
another.
The Western world’s image-based
culture has produced a pathology
of perception. In the words of
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The act of seeing in a Huichol community
Paul Virilio, “sight is no longer the
possibility of seeing, but the
impossibility of not seeing.”
Among the Huichol, this syndrome
is known as nierikarriya, a state in
which a person loses the ability to
see and believes in a false image of
him- or herself. Comparing the
worlds of image and vision allows
us to glimpse the intersection of
different cultural constructs. To do
so, we must adopt a critical theory
of vision that stands apart from the
trend toward globalization and cul
tural homogenization, emphasizing
instead the diversity of visual sub
jectivities and the points at which
glances converge and diverge. ■

Sarah Corona Berkin is a professor
in the Department o f Communica
tion Studies at the University o f
Guadalajara, Mexico.

Among Mexican indigenous peoples,
the H uichol have one o f the lowest
rates o f Spanish-language proficiency.
Twenty-five percent o f H uichol speak
their own language exclusively. Most
also practice other religions besides
Christianity. Only 48% o f H uichol
claim to be Christians, com pared to
91 % o f other Mexican indigenous
groups. The com m unity o f San
M iguel Huaixtita is organized
around traditional authorities and
religious rituals.
Hemisphere Volume 9, Number 3
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Photo Essay: Image and Vision

The photographs in the sample reveal
a special handling o f the concept o f
space an d the human form within the
pictures’ boundaries. Most o f the
photos are taken straight on, with
almost no close-ups (two out o f
2700). The photos make a special
effort to show context; in both poses
an d action shots, the subjects are
shown in the midst o f their surround
ings. The focu s shifts to the left or to
the right as needed to accom m odate a
com plete image.

When posing subjects in fro n t o f their
homes, the photographers take care to
include the building in its entirety
and afford a view o f the background
scenery. The camera may be poin ted
upwards to capture mountains in the
distance, or subjects are posed at the
intersection o f walls or fen ces to take
in both sides o f the landscape.

When the photographers are inside a
dwelling, they open a window to g et
a view o f the outside. I f they are out
side, they open doors to g et a glimpse
inside the house.
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The posed photographs depict the sub
je c t straight on, with the arms at the
sides and a serious expression or slight
smile. The form a l pose is fa r from
the wide grins characteristic o f
Western media an d advertisements.

Most subjects are posed standing or
seated on stones or the bare earth. It
is no coincidence that this im age —
with its fa r more relaxed pose—is o f
the only mestizo child in the com m u
nity. The boy’s father, who works as a
bricklayer in coastal Nayarit, sent his
son to live with relatives in San
M iguel Huaixtita.

The subject almost always gazes directly into the camera. The larger sample o f
photos reveals som e exceptions: Men w earing mestizo clothing often place their
hands in their pockets.
Hemisphere Volume 9, Number 3
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M ost shots are posed outdoors. The
H uichol attach great im portance to
context an d surroundings, which usu
ally take precedence over the action in
the foreground.

The human form is always presented
as a whole, never fragm ented or shot
in close-up. “I don’t like bits o f skirt
an d pieces o f feet, ” com m ented one
you n g man. H uichol textiles and
handcrafts follow the same conven
tion, except fo r those that depict the
fa ces o f the gods. “This is the way
you see the deer, with peyote, only its
face, ” said local resident Daniel
Castro, describing a w ool p a n el he
designed. The implication is that
only the gods appear without form ;
human beings must always inhabit a
body.

The geographical context, form s o f
econom ic activity an d oral methods o f
comm unication all play a p a rt in the
messages conveyed by the photographs.
This shot shows the setting fo r San
M iguel Huaixtita, 2200 meters
above sea level in the Sierra M adre
Occidental.
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The camera is adjusted to integrate people and animals into their surroundings. The resulting im age has more w eight than
the subject itself, who may be posed to the left or right so as not to obscure the landscape.
For the Huichol, nature an d culture
are a continuum; what affects one
affects the other. The com m unity’s
ancestors are the gods o f the earth.
Natural phenom ena depend on
humans and their relationship with
these gods. This may explain the care
with which the H uichol photogra
phers fram e subjects in their sur
roundings.
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Memory and Identity
by Marian Goslinga
t a conference last year
at Florida International
University, noted
Chilean author and
human rights activist
Marjorie Agosfn discussed the con
cept of memory in the works of
Latin American women writers.
Agosfn pointed out that in the fic
tion of many of the region’s female
authors, the ability to remember the
past creates a sense of engagement
and continuity. Their works are
characterized by a sense that past
experience—no matter how traumat
ic—should be preserved with the
same veneration awarded the present.
As examples of this contemporary
trend, she cited Claribel Alegrfa (El
Salvador) and Elena Poniatowska
(Mexico).
In the case of Caribbean women
writers, the concept of “memory” is
invigorated, to a certain extent, by
the issue of race. In all four major
language areas of the region—
English, Spanish, French and
Dutch—women use memory,
whether collective or individual, to
trace and return to the past in search
of their true identity. They go back
to the era of slavery, the legacy of an
African homeland, and the invisible
scars of displacement, captivity and
exile to tell their story. Race is a
powerful ingredient that is frequently
reflected in the use of Creole as the
language of choice. Indeed, race and
language have become close allies in
the quest for cultural identity in the
Caribbean.

A

T he S earch

fo r

R oots

In the first half of the twentieth
century, a group of African and
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The works ofMaryse Conde
Within the context of the complex and trau
matic West Indian heritage of slavery, colo
nization and assimilation, Conde’s fictional
characters search for an identity which
reflects that of a larger community.
Caribbean students in Paris devel
oped the theory of Negritude. At
the core of this theory was the exal
tation of an African cultural identi
ty long repressed and despised in
the West Indies, where the assump
tion of white superiority over black
was a basic tenet of the institution
of slavery. A key proponent of
Negritude was Aime Cesaire, a
French Caribbean author from
Martinique. His seminal 1939
text, Cahier d ’un retour au pays
natal (Return to My Native Land),
gave poetic form to the yearning
for reconciliation with ancestral
Africa. This searing text became
the cornerstone of modern
Francophone West Indian litera
ture, and Cesaire’s theme of black
cultural exile was embraced by writ
ers from all parts of the Caribbean.
W ithin just a few decades, how
ever, critics challenged the privi
leged position which Cesaire
accorded to Africa in his works—a
step intended as a corrective to
Europe’s dismissal of African civi
lization—on the grounds that it
encouraged West Indians to bypass
their own countries in their quest
for spiritual roots. In 1958, anoth
er French Caribbean academic,
Edouard Glissant, proposed the

concept of Antillanite instead. This
theory offered another interpreta
tion of cultural identity, one more
attuned to geographical reality and
historical truth. Viewing the recov
ery of African identity as a practical
impossibility due to the interven
ing, alienating centuries of slavery,
Glissant preferred to focus his
attention not on a distant, imag
ined continent but on the real
country of his birth, Martinique.
Instead of an emotional affiliation
with Africa, Antillanite sought to
incorporate the history of the
despised institution of slavery and
all its accompanying evils.
Antillanite did not repudiate
Negritude; instead, it adapted and
adjusted it to conform to
Caribbean reality. For Glissant, the
real issue became one of authentica
tion rather than denial. In found
ing the journal Acoma in the early
1970s, he initiated a forum for live
ly psychological and socioeconomic
debate about the new doctrine and
its implications for the French
Caribbean.
C a r ib b e a n C o m p l e x it ie s

The cultural transition from
Negritude to Antillanite can per
haps be traced most clearly in the

works of Maryse Conde, an author
from Guadeloupe who is one of the
Caribbean’s most prolific and com
plex writers. As a black Caribbean
woman novelist, Conde not only
highlights the tensions in
Caribbean culture between tradi
tional and modern values, but also
those existing among ethnic groups
and between the sexes. She com
bines a representative view of a
Caribbean writer’s specific concerns
with a postmodern view of litera
ture as multicultural, polymor
phous intersection. For Conde, the
concept of memory—an integral
part of Antillanite—is of the
utmost importance as she carefully
weaves together personal experi
ences and meticulous historical
documentation to develop plot and
style in her fiction. W ithin the
context of the complex and trau
matic West Indian heritage of slav
ery, colonization and assimilation,
her fictional characters search for
an identity which reflects that of a
larger community. From the per
spective of a black woman in a geo
graphically, culturally and political
ly marginal world, Conde selfcon
sciously attempts to represent the
interrelated issues of race, gender
and class.
Conde’s works may be divided
into three distinct stages that
chronicle her trajectory from
Negritude to Antillanite. In the
first stage of her writing, the influ
ence of the former clearly domi
nates. References to Africa are
everywhere, and the return to the
past is the main source of inspira
tion. In Heremakhonon (which
ironically means “welcome home”
Hemisphere Volume 9, Number 3
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in Malinke), and Une saison a
Rihata (A Season in Rihata),
Veronica and Marie-Helene, the
female protagonists (both from
Guadeloupe), search for their
African roots. Veronica seeks in
Africa an elusive sense of belong
ing, but finds instead a continent
torn by violence, ambition, oppor
tunism and lost hope. MarieHelene, married to Zek and living
in the sleepy African town of
Rihata with their six daughters,
becomes involved in a variety of
intrigues, corruption and power
struggles. Mirroring the antino
mies of their colonial backgrounds,
neither is able to define a role for
herself on African soil or break free
from a Western frame of reference.
The quest for the African past is
also the main focus of Segou
(Segu), the two-volume saga of the
mythical eighteenth-century
Bambara empire. In this awardwinning bestseller, Conde recreates
a high civilization in a precolonial
Africa that practiced slavery well
before the Europeans and had
extensive contacts with the
Christian and Islamic worlds.
After Segou, Conde entered the
second stage of her writing by res
olutely turning to the Americas
and the African diaspora. Moi,
Tituba, sorciere noire de Salem (I,
Tituba, Black Witch of Salem), is
the first in a series of fictional
works set in the New World. The
action takes place in the seven
teenth century, in the puritanical
society of colonial America and the
sugarcane plantations of Barbados.
The novel’s female protagonist,
Tituba, tells the story of her escape
from colonial and patriarchal
forces. Conde uses this first-person
narrative to rewrite the history of
the Caribbean from a woman-centered point of view.
In La vie scelerate (The Tree of
Life), Conde goes a step further
Hemisphere Volume 9, Number 3

and returns to Guadeloupe where,
as she has stated in interviews, she
comes to terms with her quest and
finds peace with herself. In this
stage of her development, she
becomes convinced that being
black is no longer a historical
appendage but an ideological con
struct. In a critique of Negritude,
she writes, “The black man does
not exist. A Europe anxious to
legitimize its exploitation created
him.” La vie scelerate, based on the
“memories” of Conde’s own family,
is a multicultural narrative which
explores the historical and cultural
significance of race, gender and
class relationships in different parts
of the Americas—Panama, the
United States, Jamaica, Haiti—and
France. Using “memory” against
the backdrop of the slave-like con
ditions of the building of the
Panama canal, Conde raises unre
lenting questions of exile, estrange
ment from the motherland, rela
tions to “others” in the diaspora
and to whites, and a return to
roots.
In what is perhaps her most cele
brated novel, Traversee de la m an
grove (Crossing the Mangrove),
Conde presents the reader with
another vision of her native
Guadeloupe, marking the third
stage of her quest for a separate
identity and the culmination of her
affiliation with Antillanite. Set at a
wake, the novel explores the diverse
voices of the community and sug
gests the impossibility of retrieving
a collective “memory.” The myste
rious figure of the dead man and
the solemn backdrop of the wake
provide Conde with the crucial
tools to formalize the quest for
identity within a typical Caribbean
framework.
In La colonie du nouveau monde,
published in 1993, Conde returns
to the same themes—African her
itage, the destructive consequences

of colonialism, the concept of
alienation—and other aspects that
keep the Caribbean locked in a dis
crete space. In a review of the
novel by Bettina Anna
Soestwohner, Conde is quoted as
saying that her definition of cre
ativity is to wander—both in terms
of geography and the exploration
of cultural and historical heritage.
P e r ip h e r a l V

o ic e s

Marjorie Agosfn has argued that
women writers are often on the
front line of efforts to better
women’s lives in Latin America.
Perhaps nowhere is this more true
than in the French Caribbean,
where the island of Guadeloupe
alone has produced such authors as
Maryse Conde and Simone
Schwarz-Bart. Given their unique
perspectives on questions of race,
class, gender and geography,
Caribbean women authors can pro
vide invaluable insights into the
evolution of a sense of separate
identity in a historically peripheral
region. The documentation of a
controversial and illusionary multi
disciplinary concept such as “iden
tity” is rife with contradictions and
has not, as yet, been successfully
completed for the Caribbean.
Resources are especially scarce
when it comes to the Caribbean
and women—both subjects tradi
tionally neglected in US academic
circles. ■

M arian Goslinga is the Latin
American an d Caribbean bibliogra
p h er at Florida International
University. This article was first p re
sented at the 1999 Seminar on the
Acquisition o f Latin American
Materials (SALAM) in Nashville,
Tennessee.

International Trade Negotiation
Skills Course
JANUARY 29-FEBRUARY 9, 2001
SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS CENTER
Latin American and Caribbean Center
in association with
Centro de Estudios de Integracion Economica y Comercio Internacional

The International Trade Negotiation Skills Course, organized by the Summit of the Americas Center at Florida
International University and the Centro de Estudios de Integracion Economica y Comercio Internacional of Buenos
Aires, Argentina, will take place from January 29-February 9, 2001 in M iam i, Florida.
The two-phase practical program is taught in Spanish over an intense two-week period. The first week will be an ori
entation to the theoretical and practical themes involved in multilateral negotiations, with special emphasis on the
current Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) hemispheric trade negotiation process. During the second week,
course attendees w ill participate in practical role-playing negotiation exercises based on a real multilateral trade case
from the hemisphere.
This course was created in response to the need for greater understanding and better management of the process of
hemispheric economic integration. It is designed for official government negotiators from the region, for business and
private sector individuals who will be affected by this process, and for academics and other professionals interested
in regional integration and international negotiations.
The course instructors are trade specialists from several countries in Latin America as well as the U.S., with extensive
and direct experience in hemispheric integration, international trade negotiations and academia. This initial 2001
course will be taught in Spanish; however, given the high level of interest expressed, in the future we expect to pres
ent the course in English, as well.
For more information please contact:

Summit of the Americas Center
Florida International University
University Park, DM 353
M iam i, Florida, 33199, USA
Tel: 305 348 2894/Fax: 305 348 3593
E-mail: summit@fiu.edu
Web: www.americasnet.net

Centro de Estudios de Integracion
Economica y Comercio Internacional
Callao 1975 - 10° “A”
C1024AAF Buenos Aires, Argentina
Tel/Fax: 54 11 4816 6525
E-mail: f-integral@sinectis.com.ar
Web:www. f- i n tegral.co m
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B I R D T H R O U G H O U T LATI N AMERI CA.
No other airline in the world offers more travel options to Latin America than we do. Now with
over 100 flights every business day to 33 cities in 18 countries throughout Mexico, Central and
South America. From six major U.S. cities. ^4s always, ^Advantage ® travel awards program
members can earn mileage credit every time they fly. So whether you’reflying to Latin America for business
orpleasure, fly the airline that's leading the way. For details, callyour Travel Agent or American at 1-800-433-7300
or visit us on the web at www.aa.com Consulte a su agente de viajes ^ ^
o llame gratis a American Airlines al 1-800-633-3711 en espanol.
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American Airlines and AAdvantage are registered trademarks o f American Airlines, Inc. American Airlines reserves the right to change AAdvantage program rules, regulations, travel awards
and special offers at any time without notice, and to end the AAdvantage program with six months notice. AAdvantage travel awards, mileage accrual and special offers are subject
to government regulations. American Airlines is not responsible fo r products or services offered by other participating companies. Schedules subject to change without notice.

